

"In retrospect we can see that the Darwinian contribution to biology was a part of a larger movement in the history of scientific thought--indeed, of all rational thought--the substitution of the dynamic for the static, with a consequent change in emphasis from substance to process. The solid, immovable earth of the ancients was set in constant motion by Copernicus. The primitive notion of absolute rest was, by Newton, replaced by the idea of constant velocity. The stars, which the ancients thought were embedded in some sort of substantial sphere, have now been cut loose from all moorings and made part of an ever-expanding universe. Nor are the earth's 'eternal hills' any longer eternal; in the scale of geological time, they are no more than tiny bumps of brown sugar melting away under the onslaught of rain and wind, only to be replaced by other brown lumps, equally 'eternal', thrust up by the unceasing agitation of the earth's crust. The constancy which man's spirit apparently craves is to be found neither in hills, nor earth, nor stars, nor--perhaps--even in the universe. If there is any sort of constancy at all, it is not one of substance or position, but one of process. Whether even this is forever constant we cannot say from certain knowledge. But many feel that it is--and that feeling will probably be, at least for a time, a good guide to new discoveries." --Garrett Hardin

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jottings from the editor's desk

BY

TED PAULS

DER STELLVERTRETER: One of the cardinal tenets upon which human society is founded asserts that an individual, possessing free will and the concomitant liberty to determine the course of his own actions, is responsible for any evil he may perpetrate. Denied by only a numerically insignificant school of determinist philosophers, this proposition is accepted by every society about which we possess knowledge. (The student of ethnology discovers that, as one progresses from "higher" to "lower" orders of social structure, the degree to which evil is attributed to malevolent deities or demons increases. But even the least sophisticated animists do not entirely reject the doctrine of individual responsibility, though they may alter its form radically--e.g., the evil perpetrated against individual "A" by individual "B" may be attributed to the magical machinations of individual "C". But a society which utterly failed to recognize individual volition would be one which did not impose sanctions against the transgressors of its moral code, and so far as I am able to determine such a society has never existed.) On the other hand, the idea of responsibility through tacit acceptance--i.e., responsibility for acts in which one does not engage but of which one possesses knowledge and allows, through inaction, to occur--is a relatively sophisticated concept and one not recognized by most primitive communities. Indeed, this doctrine of responsibility through inaction is only superficially acknowledged by the so-called civilized societies: the premise is incorporated into the network of beliefs and standards which comprise the moral code of the society, but it is habitually ignored in practice by the great majority of the participants in that society. Thus, the law-abiding citizen who happens to stumble upon an assault in progress is extremely likely to disregard his obvious moral duty to intervene and refrain from assisting the victim in order to safeguard his personal being; the white southerner who complacently accepts the distorted values of his community without himself being prejudiced is likely, when accused of perpetuating bigotry, to become extremely agitated and reply that he certainly has never injured a Negro; and so on, ad nauseum.

The interest and attention of an articulate minority throughout the entire

Western world have been forcibly focused on this issue and its broad ramifications by the release of Rolf Hochhuth's controversial play, "The Deputy". Both the intelligentsia and the clergy were thrown into sudden turmoil by the simultaneous eruption of this production onto the stages of Western Europe and the vastly more important stage of public controversy; "The Deputy" was repeatedly condemned from the pulpit, and frenzied demonstrations, sometimes deteriorating into full-scale riots, greeted the premieres of the play in a number of European capitals. When, several weeks ago, the English version of the play opened in New York, the reaction was decidedly more inhibited. Francis Cardinal Spellman condemned Hochhuth's dramatic diatribe while admitting that he had neither seen nor read it previous to damning it, several Catholic laymen picketed the theatre without noticeable enthusiasm, and members of George Lincoln Rockwell's American Nazi Party expressed their displeasure with "The Deputy", characterizing it, strangely enough, as a "hate play". In short, reaction to the United States premiere of Hochhuth's vehement play was considerably milder than might have been anticipated; it is probable, however, that the controversy generated by this production will continue to grow, and when the drama leaves the sophisticated confines of New York City and journeys out into the boondocks less restrained gestures of displeasure may be expected to greet its performances. Whatever course may be pursued by the controversy at this public level, it is certain that the issues raised by "The Deputy" must occupy a prominent position in intellectual circles for many months to come, and it might therefore be appropriate to examine at this juncture the broader aspects of the controversy.

Hochhuth's thesis, simply stated, is that Pope Pius XII was, as a result of his consistent refusal to publicly condemn the Nazis, guilty of complicity in the murder of six million Jews. This assertion understandably provokes something less than enthusiastic agreement in Catholic circles, and in the process of attempting to refute it many persons have (deliberately or otherwise) distorted the message of "The Deputy". It is not Hochhuth's contention that Pius was intentionally cruel or callous, certainly not that he was insensitive to the grim position of Hitler's victims; rather, the author submits, Pope Pius XII was an indecisive, vacillating--even timid--individual, who was sympathetic to the plight of the Jews who perished in Nazi concentration camps but remained unwilling to risk the practical consequences of adhering to ostensibly "Christian" principles when expediency dictated another course. At the same time, the pontiff was possessed of an almost obsessive fear of the Communist domains in the East, and there seems to have been some question in his mind as to whether or not Germany's defeat in the war was desirable. Consequently, according to Hochhuth, the Vatican studiously ignored the atrocities being perpetrated by Hitler's *Urbarmenschen*, since to specifically condemn these acts would have seriously endangered the neutrality of the Church--with all that entailed.

Many Catholics, in an effort to refute the charges contained in "The Deputy", have offered arguments which may, for purposes of discussion, be reduced to three basic assertions: (1) members of the Catholic hierarchy assisted Jews and others to escape to freedom or remain hidden for the duration of the war in most of the subjugated countries, as well as (to a lesser extent) within Germany itself; (2) the Pope was powerless to accomplish any alleviation of the misery and suffering inflicted on the Jews--the Nazis were pagans and atheists to whom the Pope's condemnation would have been meaningless--and therefore endangering Vatican neutrality by speaking out against the mass deportations and executions would have served no useful purpose; and (3) Pius XII realized that papal condemnation of Hitler and his cohorts would have resulted in Nazi reprisals against the Church and/or individual Catho-

lies, and the first duty of the Pope must be to safeguard the lives and liberties of his co-religionists. These arguments are, I believe, specious--though not grossly so, as this is not an issue which admits of categorical solutions or absolute pronouncements--and the three justifications outlined above must be scrupulously examined from an objective position in order to fairly determine their validity.

It is undeniable, to quickly dispose of the initial argument, that many Catholic priests actively assisted potential victims of the Nazis to escape capture (principally in the occupied countries, though the Catholic clergy in Germany is also credited with sheltering Jews and others destined for extermination), and while this considerable effort is certainly admirable and must not be underestimated, it is difficult to see how it is relevant as a retort to Hochhuth's assertion. The isolated actions--however praiseworthy--of individual Catholics may in no sense be considered a justification for the silence of Pope Pius XII, who repeatedly refused to take a stand against the attempted extermination of European Jewry. The Pope was not unsympathetic to the dilemma of Hitler's scapegoats; as a matter of fact, thousands of Italian Jews were sheltered, with the knowledge and approval of Pope Pius XII, in various Church-owned buildings throughout Rome. But what is at issue here is the refusal of the Vicar of Christ to speak out against practices which any Christian would by definition be morally compelled to condemn. This is an historical fact, and an appalling one.

That papal condemnation of German barbarism would have failed to accomplish anything of significance is hardly conceivable, though this argument is most frequently encountered. The imposition of a papal interdict upon all of Germany or the excommunication of all Catholics directly involved in the disposition of the Third Reich's "Final Solution to the Jewish Question" would have constituted a formidable blow. It might, as argued, have resulted in the desertion from the Church of patriotic Germans, but there is at least an equal chance that it could have resulted in widespread marshalling of anti-Nazi sentiment among previously apathetic Christians (especially in the occupied countries) and the subsequent collapse of Hitler's empire through internal disorder. Even if this eminently desirable effect failed to materialize, Guenther Lewy has pointed out (in "Pius XII, the Jews, and the German Catholic Church", Commentary, February, 1964) that,

"At the very least, it has been suggested, a public denunciation of the mass murders by Pius XII, broadcast widely over the Vatican radio, would have revealed to Jews and Christians alike what deportation to the East actually meant. The Pope would have been believed, whereas the broadcasts of the Allies were often shrugged off as war propaganda. Many of the deportees who accepted the assurances of the Germans that they were merely being resettled, might thus have been warned and given an impetus to escape; many more Christians might have helped and sheltered Jews, and many more lives might have been saved."

But Pius XII was a pragmatist and a man whose evaluation of Hitler's totalitarianism permitted him to fear it less than he feared Bolshevism. If the neutrality of the Vatican were abandoned, he reasoned, Hitler might undertake the persecution of Catholics or occupy the Holy City itself; expediency therefore demanded that the Pope cultivate the toleration if not the friendship of the Nazi leaders (a view precisely reflected by the Germans, who were anxious not to antagonize the Vatican). Not only was Pius unwilling to condemn Hitler's deeds because of

the possibility that Catholics might as a result be persecuted in Germany and the occupied countries, but he also apparently looked upon Nazi Germany as a counter-balance to the power of atheistic Russia and was unconvinced that the defeat of the Third Reich was desirable. As late as 1943, the Papal Secretary of State declared that the fate of Europe was dependent upon a German victory on the Eastern front. Taking into consideration these aspects of the situation, Pope Pius heeded the voice of expediency and ignored the compassion which, it is assumed, arose within his soul. It is essentially this craven and cowardly attitude toward which the wrath of "The Deputy" is directed. It is an attitude characteristic of Homo sapiens and one which dominates the thinking of every human being at one time or another in his life; it is forgiveable--though not acceptable--that any man could momentarily falter and heed the powerful dictates of expediency. But it is impossible to countenance such moral weakness when it dominates the personality of the leader of the most powerful church in Christendom. Christianity means many different things to the diverse sects which comprise it and to the even more diverse individual members of each sect, but whatever Christianity means there is one thing which we can state with certainty it does not mean: Christianity does not mean the casual toleration of appalling evil because to protest might entail personal injury, it does not mean sacrificing one's abstract principles when it is expedient to do so. In the final analysis, the accusation which Hochhuth levels against Pius XII is that he failed miserably to practice what he preached; when a choice was clearly offered, the Pope was not a Christian.

Rolf Hochhuth has been widely criticized for making a scapegoat of Pope Pius XII, since there were, after all, thousands of other prominent individuals who likewise ignored the Nazi atrocities. Most Germans, possibly including Hochhuth himself, were at least peripherally aware of the appalling crimes perpetrated in Hitler's concentration camps, and though they now claim to have been disgusted and outraged by the genocidal attempt of the Nazis, few of them possessed the courage to risk their personal security (or that of their family) and speak out against the Third Reich. These Germans have been collectively damned for their apathy and cowardliness, but none of them has been singled out for the sort of philippic which Hochhuth directs against Pius XII. Why, it is asked, should one individual be subjected to condemnation for a failure which was, after all, characteristic of most responsible citizens of the era? Hochhuth's intention in doing so is not, I think, merely to cast the Pope in the role of a scapegoat; rather, he is dramatically stating that a moral lapse which might be considered excusable in an ordinary man cannot be countenanced in the spokesman for one of the world's major religions. The silence of Pope Pius XII is more, not less reprehensible as a result of his venerable office.

THE PURPOSE OF LAW in a rational society is to preserve order and to deter individuals from engaging in acts or practices generally disapproved by the majority of their fellow citizens. It is open to serious challenge whether the law is actually an efficient deterrent, but it is in any case apparent that when a specific law, by its very structure, serves to promote rather than prevent crime, that law may be said to be inherently irrational. An example which comes immediately to mind concerns the imposition of capital punishment in instances where no loss of life has occurred. Apart from the numerous and powerful objections to capital punishment, per se, the absurdity of imposing death sentences in cases involving rape or kidnapping is manifest: since the ultimate punishment is exacted from the rapist or kidnapper regardless, it is bound to occur to him that murdering his victim and thus lessening the probability of immediate apprehension is, under the cir-

cumstances, the wisest course of action. Most people, I am certain, would prefer by some margin to be the live victims of a rapist or kidnapper, but under the present laws in many states the attacker is liable to lose his life as a result of the initial act and may therefore dispose of his victim without any additional risk.

More important if only because of its greater prevalence is the adverse effect of legal pressure in cases involving narcotics addiction, and in this instance the fundamental irrationality of the legal dicta is conspicuous. Reams of Sunday supplement rubbish have been churned out detailing the more gruesome aspects of this nation's tremendous narcotics problem, yet surprisingly few Americans possess any comprehension of the factors which actually constitute the problem. Narcotics addiction, like alcoholism, is essentially a medical problem and as such it cannot be adequately dealt with by means of punitive legislation. Unfortunately, unlike alcoholism--which, after many years of disrepute, is finally coming to be recognized as a medical problem by the majority of concerned citizens--it is commonly viewed as a voluntary submission to immorality. The atmosphere of intolerance which exists in the United States toward this and similarly extra-legal problems (e.g., homosexuality) is hardly conducive to any but the most callous and heavy-handed treatment of such social ailments. If the passage of constantly more stringent legislation dealing with narcotics addiction simply failed to satisfactorily resolve the dilemma, the situation would be unfortunate; but not only has legislation in this area utterly failed to solve the problem, it has, on the contrary, tended to further complicate the situation and militate against the initiation of a rational and workable solution. Consequently, the most serious aspects of the so-called "narcotics problem" in this country are directly attributable to the laws governing the sale and use of narcotics rather than to the narcotics themselves.

Addiction to narcotics is essentially the same as addiction to alcohol. The majority of individuals are capable, given the proper set of circumstances, of developing an addiction to one or another potent drug, though certain types of people are more susceptible to addiction than others just as certain types of people are more prone to become alcoholics. Addiction to narcotics (usually heroin, opium or morphine) may consist of either physical dependence or psychological dependence on a drug, though this distinction is of little importance either legally or factually--the difference between one variety of addict and another is, in practice, indiscernible. Physical dependence upon narcotics generally develops when individuals use narcotics for a legitimate medical reason and then discover themselves unable to discontinue their accustomed doses when the initial reason for their use of addictive drugs disappears. For example, a hospital patient who has been provided with morphine over a long period of time in order to alleviate severe pain may find himself unable to function properly without the use of a narcotic substance when the pain itself has been vanquished. Hospital personnel are extremely cautious as a result of this and are usually unwilling to administer large quantities of narcotics except as a last resort, but the situation nevertheless occurs more frequently than one might at first imagine. An individual who becomes physically dependent upon narcotics is addicted in the most frightening sense of that word: he or she is literally unable to function properly without recourse to drugs. This physical dependence is apparently non-selective with respect to the types of people affected; nearly anyone, given the proper circumstances, may develop a physical dependence upon a narcotic substance.

Psychological dependence, on the other hand, tends to develop chiefly in certain types of individual, especially those who are afflicted by neuroses or are otherwise overtly abnormal as regards their

emotional or psychological balance. Both sorts of addiction are often present to one degree or another in the "user", however, and the only significant difference between them is that the psychologically dependent individual, if deprived of the narcotic to which he is addicted, is less likely to suffer conspicuous physical reaction--though he may be driven to an emotional or mental breakdown.

The several law enforcement agencies in whose jurisdiction narcotics addiction falls do, contrary to popular speculation, recognize the distinction between the two varieties of addicts; indeed, one wishes they did not, since a most remarkable double standard exists in this area. Even the most hard-bitten officer in the narcotics detail of a city police department or in the federal agency responsible for this area of criminal activity is capable of compassion for the "average" man who, due to circumstances beyond his control, has become dependent upon the use of narcotics (e.g., the unfortunate hospital patient who served as an example above). But those given the responsibility of enforcing narcotics legislation are callous, even cruel with respect to the second (and far more numerous) type of addict. Most of them simply do not comprehend the stark reality of a psychological dependence; instead, they tend to look upon the addict as a weak-willed coward who wants (as opposed to needs) heroin, morphine, or other drugs. Physical dependence as a result of a medical accident is looked upon as forgivable, albeit evil, but psychological dependence, where the addict originally began to use narcotics in order to achieve "kicks", is considered somehow less involuntary. If there is any single proposal which will facilitate the task of eradicating the narcotics problem, it is this: convince the officers charged with enforcing the narcotics statutes that even the addict who embarked upon his torturous adventure to attain ecstasy is, once he becomes addicted, no less an unwilling victim than the "accidental" addict. Psychological dependence is no less real merely because it is psychological rather than physical. (This particular aspect of the problem is magnified by the fact that the psychologically dependent addict is often a "beatnik", a petty criminal, or a youngster from a slum environment--in other words, an individual whom the average police officer is already predisposed to dislike.)

In erroneously dealing with narcotics and narcotics addicts as a primarily legal problem, the ruling faction (politicians, civic leaders, etc.) in the United States has done much to create a legal problem which now has become a serious threat to law and order. The heart of the "narcotics problem" in this nation revolves around the willingness of the addict to commit crimes of all sorts in order to feed his habit or to actively recruit other addicts in order to insure the continued availability of narcotics for his own use. The inadvisability of dealing with narcotics addiction through stringent laws is no where more apparent than in the contrast between the seriousness of these two subsidiary problems in England and the United States. In the former nation, the unfortunate addict is permitted to legally acquire narcotics for an apparently indefinite period of time, so long as an effort is made by him or her to effect a cure. Amid screams of "legalized immorality" and "government-subsidized sin" ringing out from the assemblage of opinionated drivellers who invariably interest themselves in opposing necessary legal reforms, the singular fact emerges that England has no narcotics problem in the sense in which that term is commonly applied in this nation. The reason is quite apparent when one compares the attitude toward narcotics addiction which dominates the thinking on the problem in the United States. In this country, narcotics addiction is seen to be highly immoral (as attitude which makes about as much sense as declaring hemophilia to be sinful), and many years ago public pressure resulted in the passage of laws ostensibly intended to curb the disease. This

This enabled various criminal elements to profitably enter the narcotics business, in which their participation had heretofore been prohibited due to the improbability of realizing a profit from such a venture. This alone should demonstrate the manifest absurdity of such legislation, but even more unfortunate results followed: since the criminals came to possess a monopoly on the importation, preparation and distribution of certain narcotic substances, they were able to charge exorbitant prices for their service and thus realize tremendous profits. As the laws became ever more stringent, the illicit business became more lucrative, with the result that it eventually became desirable (from the viewpoint of the distributors) to actively encourage the recruiting of novice addicts. Prior to the passage of prohibitive legislation it had never occurred to anyone to corrupt others in this fashion. At the same time, the exorbitant prices were driving addicts to desperation: they had to purchase narcotics in order to maintain their habit, and since appeal to the Better Business Bureau or the Federal Trade Commission was hardly feasible under the circumstances, addicts began committing crimes of various sorts in order to finance their now-expensive ailment. Thus, legislation intended to eradicate the narcotics problem actually added several new dimensions to the dilemma, and addicts were reduced to purse-snatching, burglary and other unpalatable activities in order to purchase what was, in fact, an easily processed and fairly inexpensive substance. This inclination toward criminal activity on the part of narcotics addicts contributed to the widespread belief that addicts as a body were degraded, morally bankrupt criminals--thus completing the vicious circle and inspiring still harsher legislation.

Empirical evidence is clearly in support of the contention that these enthusiastic legal measures have not defeated--nor weakened in any way--the narcotics problem in the United States; indeed, the magnitude of the problem constantly increases. As a result, law enforcement agencies find themselves in the position of a man who, having discovered that throwing kerosene on a fire does not extinguish it, cannot conceive of any course of action except to constantly increase the amount of kerosene used. Stringent laws aggravate the narcotics problem; very well then, retorts the advocate of punitive legislation, pass still more stringent ones, throw the victims into prison with hardened criminals, see to it that society ostracizes them when they emerge. One hesitates to predict how many years and how much additional suffering will be necessary before society finally realizes that the solution it seeks to the narcotics problem lies not in intensifying the present indefensible methods, but rather in tearing down the cumbersome legislative structure built around the problem and attacking it from an entirely new direction.

Narcotics addiction, if it is to be successfully combatted, must be treated as a primarily medical problem; punishing an individual because he is an addict is insane, but attempting to treat and cure him is obviously not only pragmatically advisable but also the only ethically acceptable course. Perhaps a government-sponsored program, allocating sufficient funds to currently existing facilities and authorizing the construction of many new facilities, as well as providing for the rehabilitation of addicts (including the guarantee of employment and perhaps psychiatric assistance), would be the most workable solution to the medical aspects of the problem. Such a program would, of course, be expensive and extremely difficult to properly carry out, but some variation on this proposal is probably necessary in order to adequately combat the long-term medical problem. The immediate subsidiary problems (i.e., the legal problems) could, on the other hand, be solved quickly and completely at a single stroke and at no cost to the taxpayer.

ers: viz., by repealing all present laws restricting the sale or use of narcotics. This would drive out of business in short order the disreputable underworld characters who presently operate the importation and distribution of narcotic drugs, and at the same time it would halt petty crime on the part of addicts by allowing narcotics to be dispensed legally by physicians at realistic prices. If narcotics legislation, which has been uniformly harmful up until this time, were disposed of, the now-imposing narcotics problem in the United States would quickly shrink to manageable proportions.

THE BREEN AFFAIR: Most readers of this periodical are at least superficially acquainted with Walter Breen, and they will consequently be aware of the zealous effort currently underway to injure and discredit him. Charges recently levelled against Walt assert that he possesses homosexual tendencies; in one instance, the outright accusation of child molestation is advanced. Nor have the culprits been satisfied merely to malign Walter Breen; so vicious has been the assault that information detrimental to Walter's character and possibly dangerous to his continued freedom has been delivered into the hands of local police authorities, and his fiancée has been grossly slandered with the same ruthless precision. This vendetta has been undertaken by a sordid clique of self-appointed moral guardians (acting, to be sure, in the name of decency), spearheaded by William L. Donaho, the ludicrous "patriarch" of the Church of the Brotherhood of the Way. It is Mr. Donaho who is principally responsible for what can only be described as an attempt to systematically destroy the lives of two very fine people, and we can only speculate as to the motives which lie buried in what masquerades as this man's mind.

It is doubtful whether the specific accusations against Walt Breen can ever be entirely proven or disproven; some of them appear patently ridiculous, others have been discredited by eye-witnesses to the sundry incidents described, while still others appear to be at least partially accurate. It has been definitely established, however, only that Walt is inordinately fond of children and displays this fondness in ways not entirely acceptable to contemporary society. On this ground, he has been condemned by individuals who profess open-mindedness and liberality. And his allegedly unsavory activities have been publicized in such a manner and at such a time as to maximize the degree of injury to Walter and his close friends. This deliberate vindictiveness on the part of his principal accusers introduces a new dimension to the controversy; the reaction of a relative outsider must be based partially upon factors completely irrelevant to the question of Walt Breen's technical guilt or innocence. For even if the accusations against him were true in every detail (and remember that some are demonstrably false), the despicable tactics utilized by Mr. Donaho and his cohorts in perpetrating this unconscionable character assassination would impel all proponents of decency to stand at the side of Walt Breen and Marion Bradley.

Any suspicions which may have existed as to the possibility of Donaho being solely responsible for the scandalous events in California must certainly have been dispelled by the issuance of the "Report from the Pacificon II Committee on the Cancellation of the Membership of Walter Breen". This craven document purports to justify the position of Donaho's associates, and its authors (Alva Rogers, Al Halevy, J. Ben Stark and William L. Donaho) must at the very least be credited with a remarkable cunning; the "Report" is a hellishly clever chronicle. It would be difficult to blame anyone who had examined the Committee's explanation of their actions without troubling to acquire any independent information if they condemned Walter forthwith. Fortunately, a great

deal of collateral information is readily available, clarifying the events described in the "Report" and detailing Mr. Donaho's machinations; I especially recommend that interested parties acquire a copy of a magazine entitled "The Loyal Opposition", copies of which are available from John and Bjo Trimble (5571 Belgrave Ave., Garden Grove, Calif., 92641).

Mr. Donaho and his cohorts have rightly incurred the opprobrium even of those who had previously counted themselves among their friends. This can hardly be of significant consolation to Walt Breen and Marion Bradley, for Walter's reputation will have been permanently and severely damaged regardless of the outcome of this controversy. But perhaps the contempt and condemnation which must justly accrue to Mr. Donaho will serve as a warning to other malicious individuals who may anticipate savoring the delicious fruits of character assassination. The avowed intent of the California faction whose appalling animosity has recently bubbled to the surface is the expulsion of Walter Breen from the often-discordant fraternity of science fiction devotees (a group with which most readers of Kipple are at least nominally associated); it would be ironic justice were this campaign were to backfire, and result in the adoption by this group of ethical standards under which Mr. Donaho would be permanently excluded from intercourse with the micro-society.

--Ted Pauls

"I'd like to keep them out," confided the colonel, and began cracking his knuckles savagely as he wandered back and forth. 'Oh, don't get me wrong, Chaplain. It isn't that I think the enlisted men are dirty, common and inferior. It's just that we don't have enough room. Frankly, though, I'd just as soon the officers and enlisted men didn't fraternize in the briefing room. They see enough of each other during the mission, it seems to me. Some of my very best friends are enlisted men, you understand, but that's about as close as I care to let them come. Honestly now, Chaplain, you wouldn't want your sister to marry an enlisted man, would you?'" --Joseph Heller, in "Catch-22".

"As part of Asia, proud of its newly won freedom, India has insisted upon recognition of the dignity and worth of the Asian people. Nehru and his colleagues have, on every possible occasion, stressed India's and Asia's proud historical legacy, their unique culture and their promising destiny. Any assumption of superiority by the West over Asia, any slight by the former, is deeply resented by Indian leaders. Racial discrimination by whites over men of color stirs the strongest antipathy in the Indian Union. From the day of independence, Indian leaders have been implacably anti-colonial. As one well-known Indian publicist has observed: 'The antipathy to imperialism is deep-rooted in the minds of everyone in India, and that has been acquired not from books, but from national experience.'" --T. Walter Wallbank, in "A Short History of India and Pakistan".

"Religion, like love, develops and harmonizes our rarest and most extravagant emotions. It exalts us above the commonplace routine of our daily life, and it makes us supreme over the world. But, like love also, it is a little ridiculous to those who are unable to experience it. And since they can survive quite well without experiencing it, let them be thankful, as we also are thankful." --Havelock Ellis, in "The Forum".

"Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter." --Thomas Jefferson

the NON-VIOLENT defense of BERLIN

In October 1955, The Progressive magazine published a discussion of "Speak Truth to Power", the American Quaker pamphlet seeking an alternative to violence. In the course of replying to their critics, two of the pamphlet's authors, Steve Cary and Bob Pickus, wrote:

"If a military-oriented policy produces a crisis, it is just as illogical to expect the pacifist to have an answer as it is to blame the Defense Department for having no answer to an invasion that followed in the wake of a pacifist policy."

That statement has always bothered me, for it reflects the assumption that pacifist contributions to specific conflict situations are entirely limited by the number of pacifists around. It assumes that, at best, pacifists must act as a minority political force to influence public opinion within nations. Further, that statement appears to justify the continued belief that pacifists should not be expected to play a significant intellectual role, or to take responsibility for direct action when international crises arise.

It seems to me that we have postponed such responsibilities long enough. We need to recognize the realities of tragic situations and to bear witness to values that are not shared by governments. But we have no grounds for rationalizing submission to historical tragedy without making every effort to incorporate these values in action at a time of profound crisis.

The idea of organized non-violent action is poorly understood within pacifist groups; therefore, they use such action in a limited fashion. The consequences of confusion about the political relevance of non-violence are two-fold: superficial understanding and usage are proliferating outside peace circles and, more to the point, numerous occasions in which non-violent action techniques might be used effectively are missed.

Many people in American peace groups insist that our immediate need is a domestic peace movement that can organize mass protests against American military policies. The dominant tone within hard-core peace circles is wholly nationalistic. In this context, non-violent action is interpreted as one more technique for expressing anti-war protests. The forms of non-violent action range from public demonstrations (picketing, marches) to civil disobedience by individuals. While such actions draw both liberal and radical support, they have enough in common to highlight the current limitations imposed on the theory and practice of non-violence.

Current non-violent action proceeds from the assumption that objectionable policies can be reversed by amassing sufficient numbers of protesters within a single nation. Consequently, little thought is given to achievable goals, to constructive policies that might substitute for

policies that are the current focus of protests, and almost no consideration is devoted to the fact that major reversals in American policy alone can have disastrous effects unless alternative policies offer new hope of influencing the Soviet Union.

Non-violent action will have to meet new criteria of political responsibility. It must not only serve to clarify positive demands, but must also speak to real conflict situations that arise continually on the international scene. And it must prepare men to act directly to resist specific threats to world peace that result from Western or Soviet policies.

While the organization of a radical social movement is a perfectly legitimate goal backed by a long tradition of socialist polemic, it seems to me that peace groups have an obligation to act responsibly in the absence of such a movement.

The situation in Berlin provides a focal point for many of these questions. As I write /November, 1961/, that situation has deteriorated rapidly, far beyond the low-point that followed the sealing off of the border by the East German government. Just as actual warfare develops its own momentum, obscuring fundamental conflict and rational purpose in a process of violence and counter-violence, the Berlin crisis is once again generating a logic of its own. East German troops recently crossed the border and spent half an hour firing at Western forces and West Berliners. Their fire was not returned. Had that act of aggression been met by the organized non-violent resistance of five or ten thousand people, a profound change might have resulted throughout the West and in the Communist world. But the Western response was one of retreat in a well-intentioned effort to avoid a direct military clash. We are making up for that retreat now, in the only way Western military forces understand. If the process of local mobilization and counter-mobilization continues, and hour by hour decision-making is transferred into the hands of local military commanders--as it was for a time in August--the outbreak of World War III is a distinct possibility.

It is not my purpose to develop a "balance of blame" position, or to engage in an elaborate psychoanalytic attempt to explore the "real" intentions of the Western or Communist blocs. Whether or not the Soviet government wishes to "stabilize" its position in Europe seems much less important than the fact that a minimal, negotiated détente only postpones the day when we will once again face the need for a fundamental solution of Central European conflict and repeated Power bloc confrontations along mobilized borders. We must aim for something more than a minimal diplomatic deal that solidifies the confrontation of heavily armed Power blocs. "Peaceful co-existence" proposals avoid that problem completely. A profound division of the international community must be reconciled at some point in history, and no détente formulas I have yet seen approach the Berlin crisis as an occasion for real reconciliation of the conflict.

The West is justifiably uninterested in a negotiated settlement under which recognition of East Germany would require us to entrust the security of West Berlin to the whims of a sovereign and hostile East German government. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and East Germany cannot be expected to respond seriously to proposals that would unify Germany under conditions that require a renunciation of sovereignty by East Germany alone, and a probable shift in the balance of power that would result in a stronger NATO. In short, each side is asking the other to abandon its political and strategic interests. The Communists wish to create conditions under which they can absorb West Berlin, and the West prefers to absorb all of East Germany. Neither side is content with the status quo. Neither side is prepared to abandon its own interests. The result is a conflict backed by mutual threats of force.

There is deep reluctance to formalize the political status quo in Europe when all men who are concerned with democratic values are, in fact, unhappy with the status quo. In the present context, recognition of East Germany implies at least temporary abandonment of the goal of political freedom in Eastern Europe. It appears that we must give up the last rhetorical claims of the policy of liberating East European countries from totalitarian control. This the West is not prepared to do.

But it is essential to point out that what was most frustrating and hypocritical about the Dulles policy of liberation was not so much its moral content, but the West's complete inability to execute its moral responsibilities to the people of Eastern Europe without bringing on a thermonuclear war. The means at hand were and still are entirely unsuited to the end in view.

A similar problem confronted us at the time of the Hungarian revolt. Men throughout the world were sympathetic to the Hungarian cause, yet that concern found no expression in action, for our conception of direct action is wholly military. It was clear that military support of the revolution would create a direct military clash with the Soviet Union and lead to a thermonuclear war. (It is still interesting to recall that Senator Joseph McCarthy made one of the few worthwhile contributions of his life at the time of the revolt when he suggested that the West send unarmed planes over Budapest to drop medical supplies and food.) The events of October-November 1956 demonstrated the futility of maintaining the rhetoric of liberation without the means of defending freedom in Budapest.

Five years later, a similar situation presents itself. The conflict between recognition of responsibility and the absence of means to execute that responsibility without bringing on World War III is once more a source of frustration to policy makers and to the American people.

We must look for a means to insure access to West Berlin--and the recognition of East Germany this implies--without being left in the position of old frustration compounded by new irresponsibility. In other words, the defense of free men in West Berlin against any future threat of gradual absorption or of naked force needs to be achieved in a manner that is consistent with our own values and in a manner that offers real hope to millions of East Europeans who are living under totalitarian rule. We must find a way of executing a responsibility for democratic values without using armed force. We cannot collaborate in a negotiated détente, a Power bloc accommodation, a "stabilization" of a totalitarian sphere of influence without surrendering some of ourselves, without breaking the slim bond of community established by the March to Moscow and the larger bond of community that grows out of our political and religious traditions and our own consciousness.

I have two propositions:

(1) The idea of non-violent action as a means of protest within nations must be supplemented by non-violent action as a means of defending human beings and democratic values in international conflict.

(2) Responsibility for such action cannot be delayed until an individual government adopts a policy of non-violent defense. That responsibility now rests with pacifists in many countries. This, in itself, is an enormous advantage, for it indicates that non-violent defense of West Berlin by an international group could not be interpreted as action in the defense of national military interests. Such action would be clearly recognizable as an expression of values that transcend national borders, and, by doing so, offer a practical means of defending human beings within those borders.

An American Friends Service Committee staff member suggested one possible role for a non-violent force: volunteering to operate trucks

and railroad trains running between Helmstedt and West Berlin. It would refuse to transport military supplies, or to take any action that would provide grounds for the East German charge that access to West Berlin is mainly intended to offer channels for entry by espionage agents of the West. Full inspection of supplies en route to West Berlin would no longer present a point of conflict.

Another proposal earlier this year was that a non-violent force go directly to Berlin to form a human barricade between forces at the border.

Many more possibilities could be defined by those who are thoroughly familiar with the details of the situation. The nub of this proposal is that a non-violent force be recruited to implement these possibilities.

A list of 5000 individuals prepared to participate in this force should be gathered by peace organizations in all nations, including those in the Communist world. These individuals would be asked to make the following commitments: (1) Agreement that a non-violent force could create a new framework for discussion of access to West Berlin by sharply delineating the issue of political freedom versus totalitarian absorption; (2) Agreement by all individuals to have their names made public; (3) Agreement by each individual to be available for at least one month's service if it becomes clear that there is an impending threat to access rights that may provoke a military response by NATO Powers; (4) Immediate contribution of \$25.00 by each individual to support temporary training centers and collecting points in the United States and in England; (5) Agreement by all participants to accept the decision-making authority of the U. S. Committee for Non-Violent Action both in advance organization and in on-the-spot action.

The last point is not a presumptuous statement at all. As a result of the Walk to Moscow, there is no organization in the Western world as justified in accepting this responsibility as the Committee for Non-Violent Action, and no group whose motivation would be as clear to World Peace Council groups.

There are further assumptions that I make. A direct military attack on West Berlin is still less probable than a war arising from Western refusal to negotiate access rights with East Germany when and if East Germany interferes with access. Such a situation is quite conceivable as I write, and the Western military build-up in West Berlin appears to be increasing.

Preservation of rail and road access to permit passage of all non-military supplies is an essential condition of political independence for West Berlin.

Non-violent defense of access rights may have a considerable influence on West Berliners, who, in the final analysis, bear the major portion of responsibility for their own freedom and for a clearly defined policy of self-restraint that is essential to the prevention of a third world war in this particular situation.

Recognition of East German legal control over access does not involve a betrayal of satellite citizens if recognition is made by men who reject the policy of liberation by armed force while demonstrating another method of preserving the moral content of that policy.

The mere announcement that 5000 people are prepared to lay down their lives for the sake of West Berlin's freedom, without retaliation, could have a considerable impact on the West's readiness to create an official United Nations force that could, on a long-term basis, fulfill the role proposed for a temporary non-violent force.

--Art Springer

["The Non-Violent Defense of Berlin" was reprinted from Peace News.]

PUBLICOLA:

ESSAYS In CONSERVATISM

Conservative thinking people are often looked upon as little better than doddering social cranks in these days of the welfare/warfare state. Opposed alike to the anarchic excesses of nineteenth century Liberal Individualism, on the one hand, and the equal excesses of the omnipotent, positive, paternal State, on the other, the modern conservative treads the treacherous path of the moderate in his search for social equilibrium and balance. For all his efforts he is today condemned as a reactionary, without vision, who yearns to evade the responsibilities of modern civilization by subjectively passing his twilight life in spiritual affiliation with bygone centuries. A more accurate description of the modern conservative, however, would depict him as a disgruntled spectator of a world prepared to reason and plan itself into oblivion; prepared to absolve itself of moral responsibility in favor of expediency; prepared to abandon itself to the capricious whims of a presumptuous intelligentsia and a nihilistic, unprincipled, aimless and materialistic populace, bent upon nothing but self-aggrandizement and the pursuit of Epicurean delights, adjustment to a world of loneliness and mediocrity, and its own petty concern for relief from human responsibility.

(I) Conservatives refuse to indulge themselves in the philosophical delusion of the perfectible man. Men carry with them from birth to death the stigma of Original Sin, the tendency to reject ordered stability, and to inadvertently prefer anarchy and chaos. Man is neither born with a "tabula rasa", nor can a "perfect" environment perfect his inherently imperfect nature.

Has there ever been a period in the history of our troubled world in which there has been a proverbial "golden age"? Have we ever been spared the miseries of affliction and vice? Has man ever been free of the calamities of war or the threat of oppression? And if so, has this not been but for a short period, the cause of which lies in circumstances rather than in human nature? Mankind has not progressed basically from the city-states of Sumer to the sprawling industrial giants of today. Our knowledge has expanded. Our techniques have improved. But human nature has not changed; it still lies rooted in the sordid depths of our primordial urges. We must always satisfy our base, animal needs if we are to continue to live. Although man has a "soul" and an intellect which separate him from the lower forms of life, his body is mortal and dependent upon mundane nourishments like that of the fox or the lion. We attempt to control this human nature, and try to live in a civilized manner in which reason and work temper these needs. But we constantly see men acting in the most barbarous manner. And just as we do not expect brutes to attain a millenium, to live in a golden era, we ought not to expect mankind to do so either.

Instead of being born with a clean slate, man is born with urges which were inherent in the caveman and which are inherent in all animals. To live, man must satisfy his needs. And beneath the thin veneer of ordered social stability there lies the ever-present threat that he

will choose an evil way of so doing, and thus deprive himself of the fragile harmony and balance which is essential to his social existence.

(II) Man has no right to tinker and experiment with society, no right to destroy the traditions, ideals and principles of the world into which he was born. There exists a "social contract" between the living, the dead, and those yet unborn. Our ancestors have striven and even died in order to bequeath to us a world in which the ideals they cherished could survive. Neither by right nor by reason can we say they were wrong, or reject their sacrifices.

Who among us would destroy the Parthenon, the Parliament Buildings at Westminster, the Statue of Liberty, and all they stand for? It is our duty to transmit to our descendants a world in which the values of our culture and our tradition may not perish. Men living are the moral-bound custodians of the past. Civic responsibility implies the role of a steward for the treasures of the past and the present. If there are elements in modern society which we find unpleasant or detrimental to the betterment of man, as there surely must be, then it is our responsibility to change them. In doing so, however, we must forever seek an equilibrium of social forces conducive to order and justice, in order that change may not threaten liberties hard bought. Providence has not endowed us with so much wealth, so much happiness, and so much freedom, to permit us to engage in an orgy of riotous experimentation that would shake the very roots of our society. Because we never change the entire fabric of society at one stroke, we are never entirely old, never entirely new. We maintain a magnificent continuity which guards for us and preserves for our children the wisdom of the past, upon which they can build another level; and so on, until the pyramid of History towers so high that it is overwhelming and indestructible.

(III) The conservative looks to the Constitution for his liberty and his security; he does not grovel at the feet of the mighty or rely upon the will or whim of a man like himself. We have inherited a great tradition of freedom and we shall not allow modern theorists to convince us with semantic trickery that the freedoms we cherish are old-fashioned or out-dated. We will never tolerate the new philosophers who would offer us "freedom from". We will drive them away from our Constitution as we would a quack doctor from a friend who was ill. We demand "freedom to". To those who say, "I am afraid", we reply: look to God for comfort, look to the past for guidance and look to the future for hope. But do not look to the State. The state is but a small part of society; it is society's tool, never its master. Never will we plead at the feet of the state for the freedoms which belong to us. Never will we cultivate a bureaucrat to provide us with a living which we can earn for ourselves. Never will we beg anyone for the security or the freedom that was granted to us as an inheritance from our forefathers.

(IV) Men are not equal in the eyes of either nature or Providence, and can never be. In every civil society there are to be found those of greater ability and intellect, and those of less. It is by virtue of this innate inequality among men that there arises the inevitability of social class. To conform to the criteria of social justice, however, class must be an instrument of cultural and intellectual leadership, not oppression; class must be open-ended in order that reward might be commensurate with merit and thus in conformity with distributive justice. In short, the class hierarchy must be an instrument of stability and social balance, impervious alike to the imperious claims of the mighty and the democratic despotism of the unchecked majority. Those men whom Providence has endowed with superior ability, superior position, and superior

intelligence are the natural leaders of society. To provide this leadership is a duty which must not be forsaken, for if it is not they who are to raise humanity, to whom must we turn? The democratic demagogue, or the would-be planner, is a poor substitute for the man of genuine nobility of spirit.

(V) Men have a natural need of stability and order, and if this is not to be the prerogative of a "benevolent" paternal state, then it must be rooted in internal discipline and private property. The possession of property provides men with a stake in social order, and provides alike an incentive to self-improvement. If a man's home remains his castle, then he is assured of the privacy he must have. And if a man has property to which he can look with affection and the pride of achievement, and which he can bequeath to his heirs, then he is less likely to take steps which would undermine the peace of the community.

(VI) Human beings are not--and can never be--mathematical computers capable of analyzing all facets of social existence. The "goddess Reason" may be the guide to progress, but it is with intuition and with emotion that man can make a contribution which is truly and uniquely human. What is man if he can no longer feel, and sense, and want? When the liberal decries prejudice and habit and tradition in society, when he complains that these stand in the way of freedom as he sees it, he is complaining that human beings are human and that they are not mathematical variables to be fit into an equation which solves the problems of life. There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in the materialistic philosophies of liberalism, or the tyranny and oppression of Communism. And it is for this reason that their philosophies must fail, in spite of the enormous expenditures of blood and iron which have bought their temporary existence at the price of freedom. It is the task and duty of thinking men to mold the world to fit human beings, not to mold mankind to fit the philosophic delusions of the liberal do-gooder, or the twisted, tortured mind of a tyrant.

--Publicola

"If you think that your belief is based upon reason, you will support it by argument, rather than by persecution, and will abandon it if the argument goes against you. But if your belief is based on faith, you will realize that argument is useless, and will therefore resort to force either in the form of persecution or by stunting and distorting the minds of the young in what is called 'education'. The last is peculiarly dastardly, since it takes advantage of the defenselessness of immature minds. Unfortunately it is practiced in a greater or lesser degree in the schools of every civilized country." --Bertrand Russell, in "Human Society in Ethics and Politics".

"In the end the Party would announce that two and two made five, and you would have to believe it. It was inevitable that they should make that claim sooner or later: the logic of their position demanded it. Not merely the validity of experience, but the very existence of external reality was tacitly denied by their philosophy. The heresy of heresies was common sense. And what was terrifying was not that they would kill you for thinking otherwise, but that they might be right. For, after all, how do we know that two and two make four? Or that the force of gravity works? Or that the past is unchangeable? If both the past and the external world exist only in the mind, and if the mind itself is controllable--what then?" --George Orwell, in "1984".

THE GREAT

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Sometimes I despair of getting my point across clearly in written correspondence. I am too lazy to re-write letters of comment and my sloppy phraseology tends to give you the wrong impression; spoken conversation is much simpler.

Like most Americans, Ted, you are equating moral condemnation with political condemnation. You refuse to separate the two, presumably on the ground that this entails sacrificing principles to expediency. Personally, I envision such a policy as the only realistic outlook. The United States has lost two world wars (!!) because she could not realize this, and she will lose the Cold War for the same reason.

I don't believe there is a man among present world leaders who detests Communism as much as Lord Hume (I'm using the term "Lord" out of spite--it is an asinine principle that dictates that a peer can no longer serve as Prime Minister of Great Britain), but this does not prevent him from trading with Cuba. Goldwater is correct when he observes that a new outlook is required by Americans vis-à-vis the world and, particularly, Communism. But he makes the error of carrying moral revulsion into the political sphere. On the other hand, observe Charles de Gaulle, one of the few contemporary leaders who can imitate old-fashioned European diplomacy in both style and success.

Let us examine the question of Red China. Most Americans, whether left, right or center, refuse to support the recognition of Communist China for a wide variety of well-known reasons. But I hold only contempt for those liberals who wish to "accept Red China into the world community" because "you cannot simply ignore 600 million people", or --more often-- because "it will lessen their belligerency". The tacit assumption that Red China in the United Nations will be less hostile is based on the doubtful liberal premise that the other fellow is usually willing to listen to reason and that compromise is actually his objective, as it is often ours. I suggest a reading of Red Chinese speeches during the Korea Armistice negotiations or the Geneva conferences as a cure for this misapprehension.

I do, however, favor the recognition of Red China and its entry into the United Nations--on the condition that the Communists accept a "two Chinas" (or "one China/one Formosa") concept. This is my sole condition--not cessation of war in Southeast Asia, not even a peaceful gesture from Peking. But political recognition does not, as the liberal believes, imply that we can successfully negotiate our differences and resolve all outstanding conflicts. Political recognition is merely a device by means of which we can say out loud, "You exist"--while adding, under our breath, "You bas-

DEBATE

letters

tard!" It means concluding and carrying out trade agreements with China while guerillas move in retaliation against North Vietnam and Red Laos. It means, as a last resort, full-scale Korea-type war in Indochina while our ambassador dines in Peking. It means reacting to aggression the way France did in Bizerte, the way the United States did in Panama. It means acting from a position of strength where your enemies realize that you will use it if pushed hard enough. And above all, it means rational self-interest (such as De Gaulle's) rather than moral judgements should be the basis of foreign policy.

Adopting this policy, we can recognize every regime in the world except those of East Germany and Cuba--the latter because we're in too far to get out, the former because of political reasons. (Recognition implies sovereignty and hence East German control over the access routes to West Berlin. This would scuttle the justification for our presence in West Berlin (no more four-power agreements), except the moral responsibility--which is not sufficient.) (Obviously, diplomatic recognition and the resultant polite (but not necessarily friendly) relations do not automatically insure agreement in areas of outstanding conflict. But surely you realize that formal relations at least introduce the possibility of reaching an accommodation, whereas fruitful discussion and agreement are virtually impossible without diplomatic relations. Perhaps the belligerency of China cannot be tempered by "admitting Communist China to the world community", but can we possibly afford not to make the effort? Recognition and the establishment of formal relations do not, as you state, imply approval; but they do imply a willingness (by both parties) to negotiate differences and resolve long-standing disputes. My principal criticism of United States foreign policy has been our refusal to make this elementary gesture in certain key areas (Cuba, China and Germany). I am not, as you may think, anxious to give away the Capitol dome to the first Communist who requests it, but I do believe that this nation should accept as the central tenet of its foreign policy the proposition that discussion of areas of disagreement, with any government whatsoever, should not be interdicted. Like the British, I am willing to "go to the Summit" every Monday, Wednesday and Friday. This does not exclude pursuing a policy of rational self-interest, of course; indeed, nothing appeals so readily to self-interest than alleviating the present threat of a nuclear holocaust. But our principal difference would appear to be that, to you, self-interest refers to the achievement of an immediate goal (military victory in Vietnam, etc.) regardless of the effect upon international tensions, whereas in my view rational self-interest is best served, in the final analysis, by achieving world peace (coexistence, if you will) and abolishing the machines of war--a goal which may necessitate minor concessions and the abandonment of such immediate objectives as the eradication of Communism on the island of Cuba.)

To return to your criticism of my letter in #55, all I am saying is that the moral evil of Communism is a political grey, and however we deal with the Reds we must remember, as Churchill always did, even in the winter of 1941, the revulsion we hold for the Communist system, its means as well as its ends. I base a comparison of Western and Communist society on the moral precepts of the West because I see Marxism as a Western heresy, with the Russo-East European Communism

having been derived from it. As for the Asiatic Communist, I judge him by my standards because I consider mine superior. I realize that's not being very liberal, but I never claimed to be.

As for the insinuation that I lump all of the Red regimes together to be treated similarly, I hope the above has changed your mind; I say live and let live--if they leave us alone, we leave them alone. But this doesn't change my opinion of Communism in the slightest. I am not making things too simple; you are making them too difficult.

We built the greatest civilization the world has ever seen, and I don't want to see it fall in blood-soaked agony before the savage rush of "Genghis Khan plus the telegraph". The soldiers of the West who have shed their blood from Yudan-ni to Andriba, from Peleliu to Archangel, from Dien Bien Phu to Normandy--have they died in vain? I owe my allegiance to the West (not just Canada, mind you, but all of the often-dissident Western nations); it bore me, molded me, and preserves my liberty. We're going downhill now, and I want to see the end held back as long as possible. Whether the finish comes in a race war, as A.G. Smith says, or--as is more probable--in an economic war with racial overtones (poor nations versus rich--which latter category will include the Russian Empire), it's going to come; and when it does, World War II will have seemed a picnic by comparison.

The New Republic suggestion regarding settlement of the Panama Canal crisis is a good one as long as American troops are allowed to remain in occupation. Otherwise, I disagree. I remember what happened when Great Britain signed a treaty with Egypt regarding the Suez Canal. Nasser tore it up, and the quite legal Anglo-French landing at Suez produced the biggest hypocritical back-stab by the nations of the world since Italy entered World War II.

I must disagree with the reasons you put forth for the students in Panama (on both sides) acting the way they did. From experience, I would say it was more than "ornery youngsters, eagerly grasping the opportunity to flout the authority of their...elders". Granted, I haven't been to Panama--but neither do I live in the United States. No American, unless he has travelled widely and among many classes, can really understand the deep, virulent anti-Americanism that flows through the veins of many people. And to say that students are covered with the superficial trappings of patriotic pride is plain nonsense. The high school/university group has a deep and emotional patriotism that is generally kept under control while they have fun and/or study for their courses. But it is there, and enough of a spark can light it. I don't blame the American or Panamanian students; I would probably have done a similar thing in their situation. ({Yeah, you probably would have...})

It is this "love of country" that liberals find old-fashioned, interested as they are in their brave new world; in Canada, it is most evident among conservatives and socialists. Even the generally non-political student rises to sing "O Canada" whenever it is played, while the average adult yawns through it. What a hell of a glorious sound! During the Cuban crisis, it was students from the University of Toronto--some of them Americans--who provided the bulk of the opposition to the Castroites picketting the United States consulate. We waved an American flag then, and even if we weren't Yanks, we felt proud. It is students who comprise a large proportion of the nuclear disarmament advocates and other students are the hecklers at their meetings and marches. Though the conservative is caught between his traditional anti-Americanism and the fact that Canada wouldn't exist without the USA, the socialist feels no such qualms.

How many Americans can really understand how deep hatred of their country goes? They can't! America is the world's greatest, richest and most generous country; how could it expect to be anything but hated?

Look at "Perfidious Albion" in the nineteenth century. Pity the Soviet Union if it ever surpasses the US in power and generosity; then it will be their turn.

I don't enjoy John Boardman kidding me about Canada as he did in #54. It may be petty nationalism, but I don't like anyone (except Canadians) criticizing Canada. And don't tell me that, in that case, I should refrain from sniping at the USA; what you do affects the world, while what we do or will do means damn little. As for survivors, I don't think there will be too many of us left when the bombers from Russia are shot down over our territory, or the missiles go off course, etc. And I'm surprised that John knocks Louis Riel; we hung him for treason against Her Majesty, so I figured John would be all for him.

To change the subject rather abruptly, I ought to say that if you continue to argue religion with Marty Helgesen, I'll become a Roman Catholic. I don't think much of your arguments against the Vatican, and in some cases your remarks display a disturbing lack of knowledge. For example, the Pope has only claimed infallibility since 1870, only in spiritual and moral matters, and only ex cathedra (with the advice and consent of the Cardinals). If we accept the basic premise that God exists and that the Pope is His voice on earth, then I see little illogical about Roman Catholic dogma--or at least that about which I have knowledge.

Re Heinlein: I knew it had to come. Boardman voices the final smear in the liberal arsenal of invective: fascist: Can't you see the crowd rise to their feet, the snarl of rage on their lips as they tear the offender to pieces. Oh well, the pro-American was called a fascist during the Cuban crisis, Ayn Rand has been smeared for ages now, and I guess it's about time Heinlein got in on it.

Dave Hulan: Although (as usual) I agree with most of what you say, I consider your groupings of conservative and liberal slightly in error. Wouldn't it be better to classify Johnson as a moderate, the typical American of the Center without a philosophy other than pragmatism. Javits and Kennedy would be considered liberals by this criterion, and men like Sen. Byrd, Rep. Mills and Sen. Dirksen would qualify as conservatives. The latter three aren't interested in turning the clock back like Barry Goldwater or Sen. Tower, but are defenders of private enterprise, big business, fiscal responsibility, and other traditional institutions in America.

"The children of the mind are like the children of the body. Once born, they grow by a law of their own being, and, if their parents could foresee their future development, it would sometimes break their hearts." --R. H. Tawney, in "Religion and the Rise of Capitalism".

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In Kipple #55, John Boardman made the usual remarks about how people--especially the leftists--must be prepared to take up arms to defend themselves. I couldn't agree more; there are times when groups such as Robert Williams' armed Negro defense groups are absolutely the only answer. However, I wish John would extend to right-wingers the rights he demands for the Left. From time to time in his articles and letters it sounds as though he is advocating the bloody murder of everyone to the right of John Boardman. For instance, what is his position on the Minutemen? It can, of course, be argued that the Minutemen are more likely to pursue an offensive rather than defensive course, but who is to decide that? What right does the state have to disarm anybody, when

the state is nothing more than institutionalized violence? (Incidentally, I am not defending the Minutemen; I realize just what types are in these organizations, probably better than John. I am simply pointing out the contradictions in his outlook.) Everyone should possess the right to arm and defend himself. As it now stands, the only people who have the right to use force are the cops. In other words, you take a bunch of semi-morons--the scum of the community--put uniforms on them, arm them, and turn them loose to terrorize the community. I and most of my friends have at one time or another been threatened and/or beaten by these men, but even a feeble attempt to defend oneself results in charges of resisting arrest, assaulting a police officer, etc. As Max Stirner said, "The State's behavior is violence, and it calls its violence 'law', but that of the individual 'crime'."

I would also like to have Boardman's reaction to the uniformed corps that accompanied neo-Nazi James H. Madole of the National Renaissance Party when the NRP attempted to hold a street rally last May. The rally was broken up, not by outraged citizens, but by a few hundred half-plastered Catholic War Veterans, brought in by chartered busses for that purpose. It seems that the head of the local Chamber of Commerce was afraid that the meeting would be bad for business. The veterans were worked up into a democratic frenzy by stories of Nazi atrocities--"They arrested priests. They tried to take over the Church in Germany." Did Madole have a right to bring his boys along or not, John? Who is worse, the Nazis, racists, advocates of totalitarianism, who, nevertheless, tried nothing more than to hold a peaceful rally at which they would, admittedly, make anti-Semitic statements; or was it the "decent, outraged citizenry"--the Chamber of Commerce which feared a reduction in business, the drunken war veterans, and the Jewish War Veterans leader who triggered the riot off with a grandstand attempted citizen's arrest just before announcing that he was a candidate for district leader in a heavily Jewish section on the Lower East Side? Where the hell were the liberal (bless them) advocates of free speech that day?

"According to Pyrrho's pupil Timon of Phlius, the nature of things is completely unknowable. If so, the only proper attitude is that of reservation of judgement. Instead, for example, of worrying himself over questions of good and evil, a man should accept with a good grace law and tradition, and find tranquility in cool conventionality of belief and conduct. It was commonly supposed that knowledge could be acquired by deductive argument. But a deductive argument must start from premises. If these premises are supposed to be known, they must themselves be conclusions in a course of argument which, in the end, can only be circular. And if they are not supposed to be known, then nothing deduced from them can be known either. We may sometimes permit ourselves a judgement of probabilities, but the pursuit of knowledge must simply be abandoned as vain." --Rex Warner, in "The Greek Philosophers".

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In issue #54, I particularly liked Larry McCombs' essay. It stands well enough alone, and wears particularly well when contrasted to some of the source material--notably Thoreau's--which I'd recently read. Some theory concerning civil disobedience--such as Hobbes' notion that tyranny in a democratic government was impossible simply because one does not tyrannize oneself, individually or corporately--is either outdated or logically ridiculous, and omitted with some justification; but perhaps other theorists were excluded simply because they intro-

duced factors which might cloud the equation. For instance, how about the whole school of Rationalists, who were firmly convinced that the humanizing exchange of natural for civil rights--under a government--precluded active minority dissonance?

Someone like Larry McCombs might better respond to and evaluate your discussion of Summerhill in #55, but I found it interesting and thoughtful. The "rebel" concept is one which I haven't seen applied to the discussion of liberalized education in the past. While it's a tenable--and somewhat frightening--hypothesis, I think it has a couple of flaws. For one, it may be that the individuals entering Summerhill are simply not the rebellious sort. Neill has, to the best of my knowledge, never claimed his pupils to be a heterogeneous sort, or any sort of random sampling of school children; by and large they come from backgrounds which, I would suspect, emphasize the status quo. Further, I've always had a nagging suspicion about the "deviant" theory of greatness. Only a small part of it is the obvious fact that not all misfits are productive. In addition to this, it seems that the labelling as a-normal comes rather retrospectively; in part, it serves the function of fulfilling just this hypothesis, and, in part, the genius itself is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for "eccentricity". But that's just a theory.

For some time I have had the issue of Esprit containing the Rackham article in a folder separate from the bulk of my amateur magazines. It seemed on first reading--and still seems--to fulfill in certain of its sections all the necessities of an introduction to the esthetics involved in the psychotomimetic drugs. (And, wonder of wonders, it does what no one else apparently is able to do--resist quoting Huxley in "The Doors of Perception".)

The article itself has its faults, though. It is a point in Rackham's favor that he mentions the "resemblance" between hallucinogenic states and psychosis, but that's a distinction that many of his readers may have missed. Further, there is this matter of adrenochrome (which may be known more familiarly as "pink adrenalin"); it has been shown to be a symptomatic, though probably not causal factor in process schizophrenia, where the disturbance is long-term and probably congenital, but as yet there has been no evidence to link it to reactive schizophrenia, where the diagnosis between the two types is done independently of organic evidence.

I'm presently debating with myself as to which of two comments in #55 will arouse the most liberal wrath: mine about confessions under "truth serum", or Helgensen's about Oswald and the American Nazi Party. His is the more biting and demanding of reply, though mine, I think, is more of an inviting straw man. (To reply to Marty's question at this late date, it appears likely that my view of the assassination and the ensuing events would not have differed appreciably had Oswald been associated with right-wing causes. There are alternative hypotheses and these cannot be ignored, but it nevertheless seems probable to me that Lee Harvey Oswald was in fact the assassin. It is difficult to see how this view could have been any different, if--all other things being equal--Oswald had been an American Nazi instead of a Marxist.))

It could be that some commentary exists on the faculty handling practices of the University of Illinois, and it is quite possibly one which can be generalized. Several years ago, when Dr. Koch advocated in the student newspaper that mature, in-love couples might benefit from pre-marital intercourse under certain stable, safe circumstances, he was booted from the faculty. More recently, when Dr. Oliver layed bare his rather unorthodox conclusions about Kennedy's assassination, his remarks were censured in an underhanded way--but his right to speak freely, as a member of an academic community, was sternly upheld. Some peo-

ple may comment that the University of Illinois--or even society as a whole--has grown up in the last few years, but I tend to doubt it. As always, there are things that one can speak of and those which are forbidden. Paranoid explanations of the tragic death of a popular president are all right; love isn't a fit topic.

"I believe, not that there is nothing, for that I do not know, but that we quite assuredly at present know nothing beyond this world and natural experience. A personal God, be he Jehovah, or Allah, or Apollo, or Amen-Ra, or without name but simply God, I know nothing of. What is more, I am not merely agnostic on the subject. It seems to me quite clear that the idea of personality in God or in any supernatural being or beings has been put there by man, put into and round a perfectly real conception which we might continue to call God if the word had not acquired by long association the implication of a personal being; and therefore I disbelieve in a personal God in any sense in which that phrase is ordinarily used." --Julian Huxley, in "Religion Without Revelation".

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I especially want to comment on John Rackham's article, since I feel in a position to actually contribute some data to this necessarily short and limited treatment of a fascinating topic. Rackham has obviously had not even a single personal experience with the hallucinogenic (or "psychedelic" or "mind-manifesting", to use a term with fewer misleading connotations) drugs, nor has he followed recent literature with much care--Huxley's is very far from the "most recent" account of subjective experience with them. Nevertheless, his data are essentially correct and his main proposition might well have been propounded by someone having both personal experience in some degree and a close acquaintance with published material.

It's a pleasure, for instance, to see the distinction between physical and psychological addiction clearly drawn in comments by a non-professional person, though as usual the horrors of withdrawal from opiates are over-drawn--accounts considerably magnified by psychological factors seem to be the universally accepted standard, but I've heard it described by those who should know as considerably preferable to a case of measles or other severe but hardly "horrible" illnesses. And Rackham repeats the common fallacy that "...all such known drugs have a destructive effect on the body and mind of the user". The opiates, it is true, produce a gradually but steadily more severe physical alteration of central nervous tissue, cocaine is destructive to living tissue on contact and the old business of sniffing it leads eventually to the eating away of the nasal septum while injection produces similar degeneration of affected veins rather more swiftly; but these drugs are both comparatively new to human history and have no vision-producing effects worth mentioning. The coca-leaf as chewed by the Andeans contains cocaine in too low a concentration to harm mouth and throat tissue even over a lifetime and acts merely as a stimulant, while prior to European development opium-smoking with sufficient regularity to produce addiction in the East was possible only for the very wealthy--an almost automatic bar to its not-particularly-visionary effects being ascribed religious significance in competition with the ecstasies of the ascetic.

However, those drugs which have historically been considered to have religious significance have generally had no long-term detrimental physical effects. The state produced by consumption of large amounts of hashish--marijuana in a form suitable for eating rather than smoking--

was considered the result of divine blessing by the famous followers of the religious sect of the Old Man of the Mountain, and a recent survey of the literature and examination of experimental results by reputable English physicians, published in Lancet, produced no evidence of any long- or short-term deleterious effects resulting from the habitual use marijuana, even in large dosages over an entire lifetime. This has led to the current controversial speculation in England that their narcotics code should be altered to legalize marijuana, since its psychological effects are no more extreme (though somewhat different) than those of alcohol and its American danger as a precursor to opiate addiction is non-existent in England, where the opiate problem has been reduced to near-vanishment by rational handling.

The mushroom Aminita muscaria used by Siberian shamans of some tribes to produce religious visions, "liberation of the soul", contains two strong but contra-acting alkaloids which, taken in overdose or incorrectly balanced, present a real danger of liberating the soul permanently; but recovery from their effects is complete when it occurs at all and there are no accumulative effects. It's interesting to note in this connection that there is some slight evidence to justify the speculation that this fungus, found throughout Europe in association with oak woods, might be the real sacred plant of Druidic ritual, the mistletoe being of purely symbolic importance for ceremonies open to the Celtic public. Both are closely associated with the oak, a tree with religious associations for all early Aryan peoples, the mycelia of muscaria apparently being best nourished by a humus of decayed oak leaves; in some Irish manuscripts the sacred plant is referred to as "lus or-derg", lit. "gold-ruddy herb", and the muscaria cap is very similar in color to the ruddy copper-bearing Irish gold while at no stage of its life does mistletoe decently fit that description. Of course, a word-play may be involved here, since the modern descendant of that word, "oirdhearg" (pronounced "awr-yerruk"--that's Gaelic spelling for you), only secondarily refers to a color, its primary meaning being "superb, lovely, famous", and some of this derivative connotation may have been present in Early Irish. Finally, a common psychological effect of muscaria intoxication is the vivid subjective impression of becoming spatially separated from one's body and moving around as a discarnate entity--apparently the same phenomenon as the non-drug-induced "astral body projection" of Hindu yogins, so fondly blithered about by Theosophists and other California cultists--an experience uniquely appropriate to advanced and esoteric initiation rites into a religion teaching metempsychosis and the distinctness of spirit from body, and placing high value on the esp phenomena also sometimes associated with muscaria intoxication.

The most famous of the religious-experience-inducing drugs, the soma of the Hindu Vedas, was specifically approved and venerated by the religion which has since become almost synonymous with rigorous ascetic pursuit of spiritual experience, but at some period in the development of Hinduism fell into such complete disuse that no modern scholar can more than hazard a guess as to the identity of the plant from which the soma drink was prepared or the method of preparation. Hindu tradition provides no clue, regarding soma as a drink of the gods, a sort of liquid ambrosia once available to mortals but since withdrawn. Internal evidence of the Vedas makes it clear that at the time of their formulation soma was a perfectly real and physical drink used by the Aryan invader-herdsmen, and it's difficult to believe that it was simply an alcoholic beverage of one sort of another, as has often been suggested. It's equally incredible that a well-known intoxicant should have become completely forgotten in a culture which has remained intact from that day to this. Since Cannibis sativa or Indian hemp has been cultivated in India from time immemorial, soma may have been made by boiling the resinous

mature hemp tassles and leaves in water, or by steeping them in a thoroughly-fermented beer or wine; the latter would have made the more effective beverage, since the 10-15% alcohol thus obtained would permit much more of the cannibinol-bearing resin to go into solution. At first blink one wouldn't expect a resinous material to dissolve in water at all, so would predict that a hemp tea would have no particular intoxicating effect. Nevertheless, whatever the explanation (perhaps it melts and disperses in boiling water rather than dissolving), hemp tea is an intoxicant.

The combination of alcohol and cannibinol intoxication seems from reports to be a curious state, and might conceivably have led to visionary and insightful experiences in persons already in a state of emotional tension through dramatic and moving ritual; cannibinol is, after all, mildly hallucinogenic under some circumstances.

Moving to the New World, one encounters three major instances of drug-induced visionary or spiritual experience, the best known being the use of the peyote cactus in Indian ritual in the Southwest. Mescaline is only one of nine alkaloids present in substantial concentration in the cactus, and of the remainder three have noticeable effects: two are stimulants of the caffein-benzedrine-dexedrine type and produce a mild jitteriness and wakefulness, while the third is a very effective nausea-producer. This last makes the taking of raw peyote more than once feasible only for those seriously and devotedly interested in the psychological and "spiritual" phenomena produced and makes the tabloid concept of thrill-seeking high school kids being led down the narcotics trail to ruin by pushers slipping peyote into their milkshakes supremely laughable; a certain amount of common-sense official recognition of this fact has resulted in peyote being legal in most states, California being the outstanding exception. Despite the malaise produced by raw peyote, none of the alkaloids contained in it have any long-term ill effects.

The second major instance is that of the use of a mushroom of the genus Psilocybes by the brujos or medicine-men of a Mexican Indian tribe; a big spread in Life a few years back, occasional articles in various popular magazines, and the recent devotion of a session of the television show "One Step Beyond" to the showing of a documentary film of a trip made by Dr. Andrija Puharich and three other completely reputable scientists to a Mexican village to obtain a supply of the mushroom and investigate its method of use and the esp abilities of native brujos while using it, have all served to make this fairly well-known. The mushroom contains two active ingredients, quite similar chemically and with similar effects; one, named "psilocybin", was synthesized and put into production about three years ago, and neither have any physical side-effects or long-term effects discovered to date. A close friend of mine did work toward a doctorate in psychology at the University of Mexico, working with a Mexican medical doctor and a biochemist, which included a series of very high dosages of psilocybin to rats and cats extended over a period of months; no ill effects were discovered.

The third instance is the use of a brew made from a jungle vine, the name of which I have unfortunately forgotten, by Amazonian medicine-men. The vine was extensively investigated by a German doctor many years ago, and grown in European conservatories, but at the time the ingredients responsible for its psychedelic characteristics had not been isolated and I have no more recent information on it. It was used for the same purpose as the Mexican mushroom, to induce esp phenomena of immediate utility, such as discovering who stole Juan's burro and where the pig-hunting would be good next week, but unlike the mushroom an adequate dose of the brew made one deathly ill and semi-conscious. Here again old medicine-men were encountered who had used the stuff regularly

most of their adult lives with no visible ill effects.

So, all in all, there is really very little foundation to Rackham's statement that "all such known drugs have a destructive effect on the body and mind of the user" and that "the drugged man...will have to pay a terrible penalty". One might almost go so far as to say that it is a careless and unexamined acceptance of a deeply-rooted myth of Western culture, a myth generated and nurtured by the profoundly Apollonian and anti-Dionysian nature of that culture. The Catholic world at least paid lip-service to an official recognition of the rare individual who achieved "visions which agree with Holy Writ"; the sects resulting from the Reformation, epitomized in American history by the Puritans, were thoroughly antagonistic to any sort of ecstatic experience, however brought about; according to them, Man's proper role was humble, righteous suffering, strict adherence in letter and spirit to the least inspiring of the Judeo-Christian commandments and doctrines. The attitude that through noble suffering one attains to righteousness has stuck with Anglo-European culture after the considerable decay of the religious movements which brought it to such prominence, and has many ramifications: the Horatio Alger story, for instance, rags to riches through driving hard work and self-denial; Rackham's central thesis that no real good can come of visionary, transcendent experiences, that any such constitute an attempt to ignore and avoid reality, an attempt of necessity bound to fail with unpleasant consequences; and, Ted, your own conviction that the stress and painful suppression of our school system is essential to the development of those who can successfully survive it.

Being technically a hedonist--i.e., believing the proper end of human life to be personal satisfaction/happiness, rather than the pleasing of some deity, the achievement of some culture-bound ideal of justice, etc.--this attitude has little appeal to me.

Aside from the propriety of drug-induced "pleasures", however, the psychedelic drugs have two very real roles to play which have nothing to do with the users' enjoyment or dislike of their immediate effects--and be assured that over any period of time those effects will be strikingly unpleasant as well as pleasant for any ordinary person. One of these is their application to psi research, the other to psychotherapy--in the broadest sense of the word, restricting it not only to the alleviation of obviously subnormal personality quirks but including under it any systematizable practice leading to greater personality integration and increase in ability to live one's life in a full, rich, satisfying manner. In regard to psi, the work of Puharich and a few others at the present time, making long overdue advances over the stultified and unimaginative methodology of Rhine and his associates, is making application of the psychedelics appear one of the most fruitful avenues of research ever opened in the field. Phenomena which previously could not possibly be dealt with scientifically due to their sporadic and unpredictable occurrence in the population at large can now be made to occur with reasonable frequency and a certain small amount of predictability. This is something like trying to detect neutrino capture in the vicinity of a large reactor as opposed to trying to detect it at a randomly-chosen site--it's still a difficult and involved business, but at there is a chance of what you want to study happening where you can study it before you die of old age.

The application to psychotherapy, injudiciously but honestly championed by the two psychology professors recently fired from Harvard, is probably even more significant in the long run. Huxley's poignant day-dream of a sane culture in "The Island" is based on the use of the psychedelics, and from internal evidence in the story he has had a good deal more experience with their use in conjunction with techniques to which they are applicable than he had when he wrote "Doors of Perception".

tion". As he points out, it makes not one whit of difference whether the mind-cleaning and life-enriching insights obtainable with them are founded on some universal set of verities existent apart from the individual nervous systems "perceiving" them or are instead a set of attitudes assumable, for innate structural reasons, by all human beings but actually assumed in the normal course of events by only a very few, which the use of psychedelics under the proper circumstances inclines one to by in some way inhibiting or discharging the conditioning which led to the adoption of other sets of attitudes in their stead. The fact remains that by the hedonistically-oriented criteria I and many professional psychotherapists accept a person who has had those insights--if such they be--is vastly better off, better able to live a thoroughly satisfying life, than one who has not. I've had some experience with similar though less extensive insights in close acquaintances and myself, produced with the help of Western improvements on the slow and arduous techniques of yoga (and here I am not, naturally, talking about the sort of "yoga" that involves tying oneself in intricate knots and doing deep-breathing exercises) and some sects of Buddhism; despite their bordering on epistemological material, they show the characteristics familiar to any practicing psychotherapist: the "Aha!" reaction indicating the formation of a new Gestalt, integration of areas of mental life previously disconnected or at loggerheads, a strong sense of achievement and discovery, and improvement in ability to handle and derive satisfaction from related areas of interaction with the environment. Many with which I have dealt personally have exceeded in scope those normally encountered in the usual "problem-solving" brands of psychotherapy, and those described in accounts of work with the psychedelics, while still more basic and less easily accepted at face value, have the ring of validity and the characteristics of all true insights, however mundane. Most significant, the subject finds his new attitudes much more effective in dealing with situations that previously troubled him.

I don't hesitate to grant that if you hold other values of greater importance the attitudinal changes wrought by such therapy may seem undesirable to you, just as the difference in attitude between Summerhill graduates and the run of the population does. A wide variety of philosophies could be adduced by the tenets of which the entire tendency of insight-based, non-directive therapy is undesirable--that of the People's Republic of China comes immediately to mind, though I hasten to add that I recognize its reasonableness, logical force, and utility at this moment in China's history and do not share Derek Nelson's liberality with the tar-brush; it's simply a choice of values I have not made, could not make, and would go to extreme lengths to avoid having to comply with.

Finally, to wind up my comments, it seems to me that the convention of decrying the "thrill-seekers" who investigate the curious effects of the psychedelics without association with a professional psychotherapist or any particular over-all goal in mind is just a little ridiculous. The effects are interesting, ranging from purely delightful to purely hellish, and it's a vastly safer pastime than going out and working off steam at the wheel of a car, a commonplace and unremarked part of the modern American scene. It would be almost impossible to try them a few times without learning things about oneself that one is much better off knowing; the odd and superficially unrelated, affect-producing but non-significant phenomena one may encounter for a while inevitably lead into experiences with unmistakable personal importance--Rackham may very well be right in rejecting the hypothesis that they can lead to greater awareness of universal reality, but one cannot reject the fact that they increase awareness of the terra incognita of one's

own mind. This can be upsetting--it very probably always is for a normal Westerner if pursued far enough--but so what? The person who can't accept it will stop experimenting with the psychedelics after a good jolt or two, and he'll be the better for the insight gained in that jolt in the long run. If he is really interested in going on he can track down one of the few psychotherapists in the country competent to help him over the rough spots, and be far better off still.

Your remarks on Summerhill raise my hackles, but I grant you have been doing some serious thinking on the matter and could have no way of knowing the extent to which your conclusions conflict with reality. Knowledge of this particular facet of reality has neither been widely cultivated nor broadly dispensed in our society.

And without such knowledge one very well might, as you say, "be inclined to conclude that graduates of the school would tend to be misfits, incapable of coping with society as it really is", and consider it "logical to conclude that Summerhill graduates would be ill-equipped to deal with this sort of society, which more often than not fails to respect individual desires and attitudes, and imposes a rather narrow set of restrictions on thought and conduct". Nonetheless, it seems to me that a more careful examination of the situation would make a thoughtful person quite cautious of "concluding" anything of the sort. After all, Summerhill is simply another culture under the influence of which children have grown up; it doesn't differ from the standard Anglo-European Western culture the rest of us grew up in nearly as much as many others still functioning on the planet do, and it differs in ways analogous to which can be found in other cultures without stretching too much. Members of comparably alien cultures have entered ours in large numbers, with language difficulties and lacking the vast fund of specific detailed information Summerhill graduates possess, without becoming "frustrated neurotics".

One point you overlook, with fatal results to your argument, is that Summerhill children do not live with "no restrictions placed upon their activities" except "some rather nebulous instructions interdicting the harming of other individuals". Standing rules which remain relatively undisturbed year after year are made by the General School Meeting, and are enforced by pre-arranged penalties; while misdeeds too infrequent or irregular to come under standing rules are tried by the Meeting in full session and appropriate punishments decided. Examples of standing rules infraction of which brings about automatic fine or other punishment are: getting to bed on time, enforced by elected bedtime officers, no swimming in the sea without a lifeguard, no climbing on roofs, no selling one's clothes in town for pocket money, no swearing in town, no using another's bike without permission, no cutting up in movies, no throwing food in the dining room. Dealt with by individual trial are things like stealing (where, under Neill's no doubt strong influence, Summerhillians normally adopt the Old Irish legal view that full reparation is all that's necessary), minor bullying, raiding the kitchen after hours, stopping up the toilets with sanitary knapkins, etc.

The standing rules or "laws" must be re-made each year and can be revised or revoked and new ones made at any time by the Meeting, but due to the continuity provided by Neill and the staff and, perhaps most important, the large proportion of students at the beginning of each year who attended the previous year, they retain the same general character and content. Penalties consist of fines out of the students' pocket money, going to bed early, missing one or more movies, doing some useful but dampening task about the place, restriction to the grounds for a number of days, etc.; probably more effective in the long run as coercion to obey the rules essential to any organized society is the

pressure of peer-disapproval and uninhibited criticism when any child makes a nuisance of himself to others or to the staff, throughout the week in normal interpersonal contacts as well as at the Saturday night Meeting. Neill reserves the right to apply "psychological" methods to special cases of nuisance-making, bullying, stealing, etc., and to have personal interviews with the child; from his descriptions of a number of these interviews in "Summerhill" (from which, extracted from my shelves and quickly re-read, all these data are taken) he's become a competent practical psychotherapist, unconcerned with the intricacies of Freudian dialectic and professional gobbledegook but with a large fund of information about the causes and cures of the real problems of real children, built up over thirty-nine years of teaching freedom. And finally, completely refractory children, who persist in making life intolerable to others over a long period and show no sign of amelioration, are sadly but firmly handed back to the parents who got them that way--these cases, though very rare, are probably part of the common knowledge of all students, newcomers being told of them by older students, and would form a mental backdrop to awareness of the lesser hazards of short-term misconduct; for the child rejected by Summerhill must return to the normal school system, often, since much of Summerhill's population consists of problem children, to a reform school.

In all, Summerhill presents a picture very rich in "restrictions upon the activities of Summerhill's charges", and restrictions based on ethical premises drawn from the parent Anglo-European culture and shared by most thoughtful, intelligent members of that culture. Neill's aim of establishing a student society in which the freedom of the individual is maximized, within the limits set by its scholastic role and the existence of the standard Oxford exams, and by the tolerance of parents and the community, requires limitation of the freedom of the individual to take action reducing and interfering with the freedoms of others; such limitation when fairly efficiently established as it is at Summerhill does not greatly differ, quantitatively, from the restrictions imposed on an adult by the laws and the more-difficult-to-evade customs of Anglo-American society, and when one adds to it a number of concessions to the irrational folk-mores of that society, such as the interdictions on swearing in town, nudity, fornication (this last being forbidden simply by the clear-cut attitude of the staff, and handled privately and sensibly by Neill on the few occasions when a problem has nevertheless arisen with an older couple--as he pointed out to one couple, a pregnant student would be extremely damaging, perhaps fatal, to Summerhill and all his work), and the information the child obtains through home life, free reading, and specific instruction about the attitudes of the society at large, preparation for functioning in that society as an adult is sufficiently thorough that I would expect the thoughtful but otherwise uninformed person to predict no significant difficulties for Summerhill graduates in adapting to it, and perhaps even, granting some intuitional appreciation of the freedom from neurosis-forming and adaptability-limiting pressures experienced at Summerhill, the marked ease which in fact characterizes their post-graduation adaptations.

To expect otherwise indicates a complete misunderstanding of the phenomena of neurosis-formation, adaptation to social environment, conditioned versus analytical response to stimuli, etc., as they pertain to humans. This is not surprising, considering the current state of the "science" of psychology as taught in our schools.

However, this is all really beside your central thesis, since you freely grant that Summerhill graduates adapt easily and with marked success to adult life in our far-from-ideal culture, despite your feeling that one would normally expect the opposite.

That central thesis I must reject out of hand for a very simple

reason: Summerhill's population over thirty-eight years as of Neill's time of writing "Summerhill" has varied from a high of seventy to a low of forty, with a norm of around forty-five to fifty. Since this includes all ages from five to sixteen, a rough estimate (Neill fails to give a figure on this as far as I could tell quickly) would place the average graduating class at four; as a concession, I'll grant even five or six as a reasonable average. A fairly high proportion of these children are problem children, quasi-delinquents, etc., who have had serious trouble at other schools and whose parents have turned to Summerhill in desperation rather than out of belief in its principles. My high-school had a graduating class averaging around sixty for several years before, during, and after my graduation, and in a manner normal to a small school in a rural community I knew all of the students a year ahead and behind me by sight, a good many of those two years ahead or behind me as well. In four years my high-school graduated as many as Summerhill has in its entire history, give or take a handful. It is utterly, blitheringly ridiculous to condemn Summerhill's program because out of some 200 or 250 old graduates, many of whom were strikingly sub-normal in social adjustment on entrance, no geniuses and no intensely concerned, effectively active social consciousnesses have arisen. To the best of my knowledge the two or three hundred Anacortes High graduates nearest me in age--and I still know or occasionally hear of at least sixty or eighty of them, a number almost certainly including all the most mentally active and successful--include nothing even vaguely approximating genius caliber amongst them, make a very poor showing in comparison with Summerhill graduates as regards intellectuality and remunerativeness of pursuits, and sad to say my feeble social consciousness is the most active I know of in the group.

Since this knocks the argument you present into a cocked hat--my approximate age-group includes, for instance, two professional musicians neither of whom could be honestly called "clever"; "technically adequate" would be a kind and happy phrase--I need hardly go on to present reasons for rejecting your theory of the genesis of social consciousness and interest in improving one's society. Nevertheless, I'll cover the ground quickly. It is true that irrational fixation can and does occur under the conditions of stress whose presence in our educational system you laud. Check H. C. Wilcoxon's fairly classic paper, "Abnormal Fixation and Learning", in the Journal of Experimental Psychology, Vol. 44, pp. 324-333, 1952. He says, "The behavior known as 'abnormal fixation'... cannot be accounted for by any current learning theory. This fixation is said to arise either from severe punishment, confusion over equally undesirable alternatives in an insoluble problem, or a combination of the two. Once an organism undergoes frustration, his behavior is said to take on an abnormally rigid character qualitatively different from learned habits, and not subject to change by conventional learning techniques." The author goes on to relate this phenomenon to the irrational persistence of professional proponents of flouridation in the face of much recent evidence calling its utility and safety into question, a topic we're not interested in here, but I'm sure you'll agree that "abnormal fixation" as described above on a behavior pattern of rebellion and struggle against factors in the social environment felt as unduly restrictive is precisely what you're talking about, praising, and maintaining to be essential to social progress. I grant our school system produces individuals with this neurotic tendency in fairly large numbers for just the reasons you set forth, and that Summerhill-type education would reduce their numbers to the vanishing point.

We differ strongly on two points: that such neurotic fixation on rebellion actually accounts for a significant amount of the scientific discovery and artistic work which has been truly important in the de-

velopment of our Western culture, and that, assuming it does, the utility to the society as a whole of the numerically rare instances in which this mental warping takes place in the right direction and in the right sort of person justifies the incredible, appalling amount of human misery, viciousness, criminality, and just plain unhappiness produced by our normal home/school methods of education as opposed to the Summerhill system.

Briefly, there is a great deal of evidence on hand nowadays to indicate that intelligence, ability, mental resourcefulness, creativity, and what-have-you are inhibited by neurosis and increased by the alleviation of neurosis. There is no clinical evidence whatsoever to support the "Be Glad You're Neurotic"-type sour-grapes theorizing, usually undertaken or popularized by laymen, that our scientific and artistic greats owe their success to neurotic drives, to being "a little bit nuts", and that mental aberration can be anything but a hindrance in coping with the complexities of adult life. Superbly sane and well-balanced geniuses can be exhibited as easily as the nearly-insane, and several studies of young men and women placing in the uppermost brackets of intelligence tests and creativity assessments show them to average markedly above normal in mental and emotional balance, social adaptability, and even physical fitness. It seems to me best to go along with Neill's view that the child with exceptional natural gifts in a particular area, left to develop in a sane, self-regulating manner, will choose a vocation in which he can exercise those gifts, and will exercise them rather fully. There is evidence to support this view, but little if any to support the contrary, that abilities are fully exercised only under the whiplash of abnormal fixation on success, rebellion, acclaim, or whatever. Admittedly much has no doubt been accomplished by the single-minded stick-to-it-iveness of persons with that sort of drive; but little in the way of truly creative and essential work--the development of Einstein's General Theory, for instance, required the full, long-applied attention of an exceptional mind, undistracted by the demands of any marked neurotic drive--and their contribution to social progress, made at so great a cost in true satisfaction and happiness, seems apt to be much more than made up for by the contributions of free, self-regulated individuals choosing their field of endeavor and working in it untrammelled by the fears, repressions, and inferiorities generated by normal education, were the Summerhill method universally adopted. (You are no doubt correct in observing that I was not entitled to draw any conclusions from the statistically insignificant sample provided by Summerhill graduates, but I am less impressed by your attempted refutation of my central thesis. One aspect of our divergence is wholly semantic in nature: I used the term "neurotic" interchangeably with "eccentric" and "abnormal", whereas you appear to be applying it in a more clinical sense, to identify a variety of insanity. Your usage is technically correct, mine questionable, but the concept of insanity is sufficiently misunderstood among laymen to the extent that applying it to harmless eccentricities might simply confuse the discussion. My central thesis, to reiterate, is that the Summerhill system of education would tend to produce extremely well-adjusted and satisfied individuals, and that this is necessarily unfortunate from the viewpoint of social, scientific and artistic progress, however pleasant it may be for the individuals concerned. It seems clear to me that the only motive an individual could possibly possess for attempting to revise or abolish a conventionally accepted institution, custom or theory is dissatisfaction. Darwin was dissatisfied with the state of evolutionary theory in his day; had he not been, "Origin of Species" should not have been written; Newton was dissatisfied with the conventional beliefs about physics prevalent in the period of his early life; Jesus was dissatisfied with the moral/re-

ligious teachings and practices of his era, Karl Marx with the social/political situation, and so on, ad infinitum. Especially in science--but also in art, music, literature, theology, et al.--progress has generally occurred when a single individual or, at most, a small group has challenged conventionally accepted forms and theories. In some cases, the individuals responsible may have been iconoclasts in only one area--Darwin appears to have been one such--but the willingness to challenge orthodoxy has most often been correlated with a similar flaunting of convention in other areas. Thus, a great number of creative scientists have been introverts, religious nonconformists, and advocates of unusual political or social doctrines; few creative geniuses have displayed any particular concern with the conventional customs of dress, appearance, etc. (Einstein, whom you cite as a paragon, refused to wear ties or socks); "normal" sex lives have been decidedly the exception rather than the rule amongst the giants of science and philosophy. The "average" creative genius may not be an outright neurotic (such as Cavendish or van Gogh), but he will tend more toward this extreme than toward "normalcy" as assigned by society as a whole. We can argue endlessly the question of whether a given genius was clinically insane or merely eccentric, neurotic or "unconventional"; but it does not appear to me debatable that a majority of creative geniuses have been abnormal, i.e., neither "satisfied" nor "well-adjusted". The result of the exclusion of these "abnormal" individuals from society is stagnation of that society, an assumption illustrated neatly by the state of Western civilization during the period following the fall of Rome and preceding the Renaissance. An obscurantist church labored, during this period, to preserve a profitable orthodoxy, an attempt which could only succeed by discouraging original thought in nearly every field of knowledge and, when this appeared in danger of failing, undertaking the wholesale murder of "heretics". The effect, though not the intent, of a widely-instituted program of Summerhill-type education would be the same--and probably a good deal more thorough. Instead of torturing and executing heretics, the Summerhill school system would prevent them, giving rise to a nation of happy, well-adjusted, intelligent conformists. Perhaps, as you contend below, the advantages would offset the disadvantages; though I denied this explicitly in Kipple #55, it may be that such a view is hasty. But it is in any event clear that the initiation of such a program must await the creation of a rational world community and the abolition of overt conflict between nations, for making the experiment at this time would be committing national suicide: our ideological opponents are tending toward the opposite extreme, that of encouraging strong discipline and single-minded devotion in education, and the results, in terms of Soviet scientific achievements, speak for themselves.)

And even if this were not true, if a total change-over to "free schools" resulted in a net reduction in the amount of scientific, artistic, and social contribution made to the society--and with the paucity of relevant firm information in psychology I cannot consider this impossible; just, for the reasons given above, quite unlikely--one should be faced with a serious ethical question: are the vast numbers of broken homes, wretched lives, suicides, crimes of all sorts, warped minds who find congenial the contemplation of mass murder and destruction, and the like, the great bulk of which could never come about given Summerhill schooling, worth a somewhat higher rate of technological and scientific progress and artistic achievement? Your whole discussion brushes over this point, almost ignores it; yet it seems to me completely crucial. You also ignore the fact that the worst of the social ills against which the reformers you think so necessary would be campaigning would automatically be eliminated by universal "free school" upbringing--an impossibility for this country in the foreseeable future, of course, but

as the number of free schools increased, increasing the proportion of reasonably sane citizens in the population who accept as a matter of course the ethical basis of Summerhill, the allowance of complete personal freedom to everyone not encroaching on the like freedom of others (with its social-action concomitant of yelling one's head off in public for the restriction of anyone encroaching on one's own freedoms, and supporting the just complaints of other yellers--patterns of behavior forming the very foundation of Summerhill life), the more blatant social evils of the country would seem less and less acceptable to more and more people and their perpetrators would be placed under more and more pressure to discontinue them--not the pressure of neurosis-fed crusades but that of ethically-oriented citizens acting through the now-poorly-utilized democratic machinery of the Anglo-American nations, the use of which will seem to them normal and natural.

I am tempted despite the already great length of this letter to delve into a question of basic values. It's commonplace in our culture to consider "progress" inherently good. I consider it a process which has a large number of good or potentially good by-products, a process generally worthy of encouragement, but one containing no inherent value and with already partially-realized potentials for great evil. It seems patently ridiculous to consider inherently good a process which has a fair probability of leading to denouements as undesirable as the destruction of humanity, laying radioactive waste to half the planet, the eventual conversion of Man's world into a planet-spanning ferro-concrete anthill and Man into the teeming ultra-regimented synthetics-and-plankton eating inhabitants thereof, and the like; and the thing is a great Juggernaut, moving of itself in a path determined by the interaction of the impersonal mass psychodynamics of the great modern cultures, the nature and various applicabilities of the physical laws gradually revealed by our probings, and sheer random chance; long beyond control by the few members of the race sufficiently concerned with overall patterns and long-term effects. The insular Anglo-Saxon cultures (geopolitically North America is a big island; Mexico has little more effect on us than the native Cymric- and Gaelic-speaking Celtic enclaves have on Great Britain) would be vastly better off could some way be found to swap some of their "progressiveness" for a higher incidence of sanity and a greater willingness to contemplate the distant future results of current actions in terms of human happiness and esthetic satisfaction. Such an alteration, though without effect on the great Eurasian forces, might still bring a ray of hope into the long-range picture, and something on the order of the free schools, multiplied and popularized beyond all reasonable expectation, is the only way it could be brought about.

"A few malcontents," rumbled the Professor ominously, 'dare to deny that human civilization has progressed in any significant non-material fashion.' He paused to chuckle superciliously, as a sign that the fallacy of this belief was self-evident. 'In rebuttal to these demented cavers, it is only necessary to observe that Christ was crucified for his preachings two thousand years ago, whereas--were he to appear today--he would merely be incarcerated in a lunatic asylum.'" --George Allen Bond, in "A Kind of Folly".

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I disagree with your analysis of Summerhill. The Summerhill-type school is not a particularly good school; on the other hand, I do not believe that students must be oppressed and made neurotic in order to emerge as socially conscious. And there are many who would disagree with

your major thesis that great human contributions are the result of neuroses, including Fromm, Lindner, Horney, etc. Certainly there are great men who have been neurotic, but it is often thought that they have been great in spite of their neurosis, not because of it.

There is an outstanding fault in the Summerhill method, but this does not mean that the only alternative is authoritarianism. There exists a middle ground--what Erich Fromm calls rational authority--where students undergo discipline in order to learn, but not unreasonable discipline. The trouble with Summerhill students is that they learn only what attracts them, the easy, interesting subjects, and this does not include such complicated and unpleasant topics as political philosophy or history. I would be inclined to think that if these students are not concerned about the state of the world, it is only because (like most people) they don't know what that state is; this is simple ignorance.

According to Robert Lindner, in "Prescription for Rebellion", an individual who is well-adjusted to this society would tend to be rather neurotic, and I agree with him--both theoretically and as a result of observation.

Incidentally, Bertrand Russell had a rather free and pleasant upbringing. I suggest that you read what he says about these advantages in "The Conquest of Happiness".

"The story of the angel announcing what the church calls the immaculate conception is not so much as mentioned in the books ascribed to Mark and John; and is differently reported in Matthew and Luke. The former says the angel appeared to Joseph; the latter says it was to Mary; but either Joseph or Mary was the worst evidence that could have been thought of, for it was others that should have testified for them, and not they for themselves. Were any girl that is now with child to say, and even to swear it, that she was gotten with child by a ghost, and that an angel told her so, would she be believed? Certainly she would not. Why, then, are we to believe the same thing of another girl, whom we never saw, told by nobody knows who, nor when, nor where? How strange and inconsistent it is, that the same circumstance that would weaken the belief even of a probable story, should be given as a motive for believing this one, that has upon the face of it every token of absolute impossibility and imposture!" --Thomas Paine, in "The Age of Reason".

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Thank you for considering my letter worth such a lengthy and detailed answer. If this reply is shorter it is not because I agree with your points, but because I feel they are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Church's claims and the evidence she offers in support of them. To help clarify them I shall quote once more from "The Belief of Catholics" (page 36 of the paperback edition):

"By an equally grotesque illusion most Englishmen have the idea that Catholics base all their religious beliefs on the authority of the Church. And if we pressed them with the difficulty, 'Yes, but on what do Catholics base their belief in the authority of the Church? Do they base that of the authority of the Church too?' I suspect that most Englishmen would reply, 'Of course.' These people are Catholics, therefore any reason or no reason is good enough for them. They are a race apart, ogres,

not men.

"Let me then, to avoid further ambiguity, give a list of certain leading doctrines which no Catholic, upon a moment's reflection, could accept on the authority of the Church and on that ground alone:

- (i.) The existence of God.
- (ii.) The fact that he has made a revelation to the world in Jesus Christ.
- (iii.) The Life (in its broad outlines), the Death, and the Resurrection of Jesus Christ.
- (iv.) The fact that our Lord founded a Church.
- (v.) The fact that he bequeathed to that Church his own teaching office, with the guarantee (naturally) that it should not err in teaching.
- (vi.) The consequent intellectual duty of believing what the Church believes."

I also would like to call attention to the final sentence of the passage I quoted in my last letter. "Thus and thus only can the human intellect reasonably accept statements which (although they cannot be disproved) cannot be proved by reason alone." (Emphasis added.) (My point, of course, was that the human intellect ought not to accept statements which cannot be proved by reason or demonstrated conclusively. One may be justified in entertaining hypotheses which are not entirely established as irrefutable, but to assert them dogmatically is wrong.)

You say that one ought to consider the available data in making a decision. I completely agree. Divine revelation is data and ought to be considered when it is available. (Divine revelation would be utterly conclusive data which even a heathen such as your obedient servant would be forced to accept; if God appeared to me and announced that the Catholic Church was morally infallible, I should be entirely willing to repudiate all of my previous objections. Unfortunately, this has not as yet occurred, and the reported instances of divine revelation have been sufficiently rare that I strongly doubt that I would be fortunate enough to be chosen for this singular honor. Failing that, our evidence consists only of second-hand reports, such as the story of Moses receiving the Ten Commandments. According to the relevant sections of the Old Testament, these commandments were inscribed on a stone tablet by the finger of God, but the only evidence attesting to the truth of this remarkable event is the statement of an anonymous scholar (since Moses himself did not write the sections of the Old Testament attributed to him by the ignorant). Unless a contemporary thinker is predisposed to accept this tale (through the sort of circular reasoning I criticized), this is hardly conclusive evidence. After all, we feel perfectly justified in rejecting some of the more incredible tales related by the naive but brilliant Herodotus; is the veracity of Moses' anonymous biographer to be assumed a priori? The same difficulty exists with respect to the New Testament. Jesus, like Socrates, neglected to transcribe into writing his teachings, thus trusting his contemporaries to faithfully report his philosophy. Without inferring that Matthew, Mark, Luke and John were intentionally dishonest, it remains advisable to defer judgment on their specific claims--after all, the four were simply fallible human beings and the accuracy of their reporting leaves much to be desired (they contradict each other with respect to the details of events at which all claim to have been present). Divine revelation, then, is little more than heresay, and heresay is hardly proof of anything.)

There never was any infallible teaching on the question of the

relative movement of the earth and the sun, since this is a question pertaining to the physical sciences rather than theology.

The only point I was making in the question of laws was that the Church does not teach that everything that is immoral should necessarily be illegal also. There are, though, unless you are an anarchist, some actions which should be subject to legal restraints. Some of these are murder, robbery, discrimination (racial, religious, etc.), highway safety, and public utterances whether vocal or in print. I should have expected that while you would disagree on some specific laws you would agree with the principles involved. What is your dissent to Summerhill if it is not that, "They do not endeavor to uproot social injustices or inequities"? And if people do seek "to redeem the world", by what standards are they to decide what reforms are needed if not by their own individual moral standards? Surely, for example, your plea in Kipple #36 for legal action to support integration was motivated more by the immorality of racism than by consideration of the advantages we would acquire in dealing with Afro-Asian countries. (The point is well-taken, admittedly, but appears to be something of a red herring when introduced into a discussion of censorship and the right of a religious sect to seek legislation imposing its moral code upon the civil community. My ethical standards may be indefensible, but I think that a good case could be made against segregation without reference to individual codes of morality. Depriving a segment of the citizenry of the rights and privileges enjoyed by the majority might, e.g., be seen as objectionable on the simple ground that such a practice was inconsistent with American concepts of freedom. Be that as it may, a distinction must surely be drawn between my attempts to prevent bigots from persecuting Negroes, on the one hand, and the attempts of the Catholic Church to prevent me from reading certain specific books, on the other. The civil community has a duty to prevent the first act, since it entails injury to an unwilling victim, but no individual, group or institution possesses a legitimate concern with the second act, which entails a voluntary action on my part unlikely to affect another party. I am not merely contending that the Catholic Church errs in campaigning for legislation in this sphere; rather, I am saying that the civil community itself is without the right to legislate in this area. My objections are precisely the same (and equally vehement) when the would-be censors are Protestants, Jews, Hindus, atheists, or Muslims. And of course the same prohibition extends to my personal moral code as it applies to this sphere: I am sure that the various publications of the American Nazi Party are as offensive to me as "Fanny Hill" is to a New England Puritan or "The Deputy" is to a Catholic, but I cannot accept the position that it is therefore my right to lobby for restrictive legislation against such literature.)

The only way we know that God created the universe with a beginning is that he told us. Apart from that, it may seem more probable that there was a beginning but it is not necessary. The arguments for the existence of God are not affected either way, as is shown by the following passage from Frank Sheed's "Theology and Sanity", p. 118n.:

"The question whether the universe has a beginning in time, a first moment, does not touch the question whether the universe has a creator. It is not because the universe once was not and now is that we argue that God must have brought it into being. It is because whether the universe had a beginning or not, it does not contain within itself the reason for its own existence, so that its existence can be accounted for only by a being who is in Himself the sufficient reason for His exist-

ence. God must have made it, and made it as to its totality. There are theists who hold that it is impossible to prove from reason that the universe does not go back endlessly into the past. But just as this does not destroy the need of a self-existent being to give the universe existence and maintain it in existence, so it does not mean that in this hypothesis the universe would be eternal. We have already sufficiently seen that endlessness in time does not constitute eternity."

As the above passage also shows, I am not postulating a First Acorn since acorns do not exist of their own natures but rather have causes. To help clarify this I shall adapt a common illustration. If, while driving along a country road, we were stopped at a railroad crossing by a freight train, I would accept your explanation that the box car crossing the road was being moved by the box car in front of it. I would further agree that that box car was being pulled by the one in front of it. However, I would not agree that there was nothing up front except an infinite string of box cars--not even if you claimed that one of them was a solid marshmallow box car one trillion light-years long. I would insist that logically there must be a locomotive. Box cars do not move on their own, they are moved. (This splendid analogy is excellent as far as it goes, but why break it off so abruptly? The necessity of a locomotive to move these many box cars is clear to me, but I cannot accept the position that the locomotive exists independently because it is the nature of the object to exist. Granted that the box cars rolling by are explained in terms of a locomotive, how did the locomotive come to be there? If you attempt to explain the existence and motion of the locomotive through semantic hocus-pocus, then I feel perfectly justified in discarding the concept of a locomotive and instead explaining the existence and motion of the box cars in the same manner. The difficulty encountered by theists in such an argument is that if the chain of cause-and-effect can be interrupted at one point by a mysterious quantity whose nature it is to exist, then it can be interrupted at any other point by the same device. It seems impossible, on the face of it, that something could exist without being caused, but if you introduce the possibility of this in fact being the case, then something other than what you choose to call God could as easily occupy this position. To deal very briefly with Mr. Sheed's remarks, let me say that I am completely unable to comprehend his casual observation that "endlessness in time does not constitute eternity". Can he possibly be implying that (absurd though it may sound) there was a time before time began? If "eternity" and "endlessness in time" are not synonymous, then one must be of longer duration than the other--a rather remarkable state of affairs which I trust you will explain in detail when next you write. Also, the statement that "whether the universe had a beginning or not, it does not contain within itself the reason for its own existence" must be equating "reason" with "justification" rather than "cause"--since a quantity lacking a beginning would obviously need no cause. This removes the discussion from the sphere of science and transfers it to ethical philosophy, an interesting diversion but hardly relevant either to this discussion or to the point which Mr. Sheed apparently believes himself to be defending.)

Implying that God does not exist because he cannot be seen or analyzed into his component gases is like saying that the sun does not exist because we cannot put a slice of it under a microscope for study. However, it is possible to define and study the attributes of God; you did so quite well when, in replying to letters from Dennis Lien in Kipple #46 and Charles Crispin in #48, you showed that there could be only

one omnipotent and infinite God.

To Dave Hulan I would like to point out that while error has no rights according to Catholic teaching, people in error do.

"Confucianism emphasizes man's relations within human society. Confucius (c. 551-479 B.C.) and the chief early developers of his view, Mencius (c. 371-289 B.C.) and Hsun Tzu (c. 300-235 B.C.), defined goodness and propriety largely in terms of father-son, ruler-subject, husband-wife, elder brother-younger brother relationships. They laid special stress on filial piety, from which they thought all other virtues derived. They also dwelt at length on what government ought to be, denouncing tyranny and injustice, advocating state responsibility for popular welfare, and especially urging that government should be entrusted to learned men of proved moral character who might serve as exemplars of proper thought and conduct for the common people. To be a Confucian is not easy. It requires assimilation of the experience and wisdom of the past, unwavering dedication to a life of ceremonious and gentlemanly conduct, and sober acceptance of a heavy burden of social and political responsibilities. Above all, it requires constant, earnest efforts to decide what is the right thing to do in any given circumstance, for Confucius did not presume to prescribe absolute standards. Confucianism, then, is a rational, humanistic approach to the problems of life and society." --Charles O. Hucker, in "Asia in the Modern World".

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Congratulations on your article on the Supreme Court; it was magnificent. I have never read a better explanation of the way our Supreme Court works and the reasons for it being independent of any other influence in our governmental system. You were wrong on only one minor point of semantics: this nation is not a democracy, but a representative republic. (Good grief! I immodestly believed that my essay on the independent judiciary was rather good, but now I'm worried--compliments from A. G. Smith are a frightening sign.)

MacLean seems to think that jobs are easy to find, but I know better; he also apparently believes that everybody has sufficient capital to buy land and materials to build a bomb shelter. Cement is not cheap and I have never been anywhere in this country where a farmer would give away large quantities of sand and gravel. I do wish MacLean would list some of these jobs in which it is possible to make a living and take vacations of weeks at a time; even hunting, fishing, trapping or similar free-and-easy occupations won't support a family.

Very likely I am rude and crude, but why specify that Chay Borsella is a female? There was no way of telling by the name or the tone of her letter. Anyway, the women today smoke cigars, drink hard liquor, wear trousers, vote the Democratic ticket and join the armed forces in war time. From this current letter of hers it would seem that she does not regard the privilege of a college education as a chance to improve her knowledge of the world and what makes it tick. She is right when she says that life is for living, but to a person of a curious and inquiring mind learning is fun. I have always thought that it is not a waste of time to educate a girl to the greatest extent of which she is capable, even if she then proceeded to spend her life being a wife and mother. On the other hand, if Miss Borsella thinks of college as a status symbol and cannot find enjoyment in learning, she would be better off learning to cook and allowing some potential scholar to use the facilities at Towson State College that she is wasting.

Why is it that your letter writers do not read closely? I am not

a racist. As an anthropologist, I know that the best of the blacks, the Spanish-speaking Indians of Mexico and further south, the Chinese and other Asiatics may have as high an IQ as the white man. I merely note that these other breeds are different from us, and that they outnumber us in the world, and that we are allowing the hordes of Mexico and the West Indies to move into this nation's territory as they please. There is only so much room in this country, there is only so much arable land, and so there is necessarily a limit to the population at our present standard of living. I want this land saved for my own kind; I do not want to see Americans living off the produce of a quarter acre of land and living in filth and ignorance, as in India and elsewhere.

Your letter writers are still slamming Bob Heinlein as a militarist, but I wonder if they have actually read "Starship Trooper"? To become a voting citizen in the society postulated by that novel, you did not have to serve a term as a combat soldier (read page 43 et seq. in the hardcover edition or page 25 et seq. in the paperback edition). If a man or woman wanted to enlist, the government had to take them regardless of age or physical condition, then find a "dirty, nasty, dangerous job" for them. You could resign anytime, though that meant you would never be a citizen. Recruiting sergeants were horror cases as a hint that if you joined, it could happen to you. The government made it very plain that they did not give a damn whether you enlisted or not. Survivors had paid a high price for the right to vote--maybe being a test animal for some new drugs or vaccines, or anything else nasty and dangerous.

I think that Charley intended classing me along with the "Minutemen of 1964" as an insult, but as I never heard of them he missed the target. I wonder, incidentally, what his military record is like? I bet that if he has any, he was a sheriff's deputy...

I was recently talking to a young man who just returned from Ecuador, where he has been a member of the Peace Corps trying to get those Altoplano Indians to cooperate in building school houses. They won't; it is every man for himself. He was there when Kennedy was killed, and the Jefe Politico wanted to know if this new President Oswald would put an end to the Peace Corps program. We should try to make ersatz Americans out of such ignoramuses?

"Thucydides' truth was immeasurably more profound. In life's uneasy panorama he could discover unchanging verities. He could probe to the depths the evils of his time and perceive them all grounded in the never varying evils of human nature. In Sparta's victory over Athens he saw what the decision of war was worth as a test of values, and that war would forever decide matters of highest importance to the world if men continued to be governed by greed and the passion for power. What he knew was truth indeed, with no shadow of turning and inexpressibly sad." --Edith Hamilton, in "The Greek Way".

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Per usual, I have to take exception to a few remarks by A. G. Smith in this most recent Kipple. Considering Mr. Smith's self-proclaimed liberalism, I am astounded by his lack of humanism; considering his apparent conservatism, I am astounded by--of all things--his lack of religiosity. A good Christian deity is part of a conservative's equipment. Few right-wingers can afford to do without this device, as they must attempt to justify on "spiritual" grounds what they cannot palm off as materially humane. Thus: "What matters it if a person cannot live in a decent house or eat at a restaurant of his choice--is not his immortal

soul more important than his physical well-being?" This, at least, is absent in the case of Mr. Smith; could it be that he is in fact an anarchist?

Why, incidentally, should we owe loyalty to ourselves, our families, our in-groups, our out-groups and the human race, in that descending order of importance? Does Mr. Smith ever make exceptions to this rule? If, for example, he were to contract a highly contagious disease, would he go to a motion picture theatre and expose members of the latter groups if the show is one he particularly wants to see? Would he tell a lie to protect his family at the risk of injuring an innocent member of his "out-group"? Why should we be more loyal to our family--whom we didn't choose and who didn't choose us--than to our friends? Only an extreme narcissism, it seems to me, would make us place our ancestors first, always, regardless of all else. Anyone following this system must think that traits are handed down unchanged, from parent to child.

Tom Seidman: I am an opponent of abortion, but I would certainly not say that abortion is murder--provided that you can rationalize it with your superego, it is not. I personally could not rationalize it, anymore than I could rationalize walking up to you and jamming a knife in your back. Contraceptives, on the other hand, present an entirely different situation. I can see, viewing the earth's crowdedness, that it would be unwise for everyone to have, say, ten or twelve children. But the use of contraceptives is really an unfair way of playing the game, since the "other side" (the potential for a seed to be planted which could develop into a human being) isn't given any chance at all. It seems to me that everyone should have a chance to win; and if one doesn't want to risk losing, then perhaps one shouldn't risk playing the game at all. (Your markedly unusual manner of viewing this situation, equating human reproduction with some sort of cosmic crap game, puzzles me somewhat, but your observations do introduce--obliquely--a point which deserves consideration. Eugenics systems customarily collapse as a result of heredity's uncooperativeness in adhering to the cliché, "Like father, like son." To an extent, exceptional ability (artistic, athletic, scientific, etc.) appears to be influenced by the existence of like qualities in one's biological parents and prior ancestors, but the exceptions are so very numerous that the "rule" can hardly be said to exist. Eugenics systems, therefore, which seek to encourage reproduction between exceptional individuals and discourage mating between the sub-normal, come to grief because even the most refined of such systems is hardly able to do more than increase the mathematical probability of an "exceptional" child by an insignificant fraction. It has occurred to me as a result of your remarks (the point was implicit if not explicit in them) that another objection to the widespread use of contraceptives might very well be that such a process, by non-eugenically (i.e., randomly) limiting births, would tend to decrease the percentage of individuals born with exceptional ability. The coldly rational solution to this dilemma is to allow unrestrained reproduction, determine which individuals possess exceptional abilities, then destroy the surplus; but this is the rationality of a termite nest, failing completely to recognize any value in human life.)

Furthermore, perusing Tom Seidman's remarks, destruction of deformed or imperfect births seems to me the cruelest jab of all. Intelligence is no more than relative, and to some race of super-minds in the unseen universe we ourselves might be considered second-rate, inferior, "unacceptably deformed". How do we dare judge? (I failed only through oversight to reply to Tom's remarks in #56 regarding the disposal of the unacceptably deformed. Ironically, at this very time euthanasists who not only advocated but also carried into practice this philosophy are

being tried in West Germany as war criminals. I cannot believe that Tom would wish to be identified with such a philosophy, were he to give the matter sufficient thought. The doctrine of individual liberty (which the conservative loudly advocates but fails to understand, while the liberal adapts it to a modern society and makes it workable) is founded on the belief that a human life is inherently valuable and consequently sacrosanct, with the necessary corollary that an individual should be permitted to pursue whatever course he chooses, provided that, in doing so, he does not interfere with the liberty of others. It is an evasion of this principle so blatant as to be hardly worth mentioning to arbitrarily define as non-human those persons of whom we would like to dispose. If on no other grounds, it is objectionable because it can establish a nasty precedent: the society which can exclude deformed infants from the human race and decree their execution can, with the same authority, dispose of any other "undesirable" minority--a category into which most religious, political or ethnic groups could conceivably be placed.))

"Freedom has appeared in the world at different times and under various forms; it has not been exclusively bound to any social condition, and it is not confined to democracies. Freedom cannot, therefore, form the distinguishing characteristic of democratic ages. The peculiar and preponderating fact which marks those ages as its own is the equality of condition; the ruling passion of men in those periods is the love of this equality. Ask not what singular charm the men of democratic ages find in being equal, or what special reasons they may have for clinging so tenaciously to equality rather than to the other advantages which society holds out to them: equality is the distinguishing characteristic of the age they live in; that, of itself, is enough to explain that they prefer it to all the rest." --Alexis de Tocqueville, in "Democracy in America".

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I was rather interested to see my Quantifier essay reprinted. I am pleased with the way it reads after two years, but I think that I made some basic errors in the essay, and I'd like to make a few remarks about them. When it first appeared, the essay received savage criticism because I used goal-seeking behavior as my criterion of sanity. Despite the heat of these arguments, I do not think that they seriously damaged my thesis. The term "goal" is poor; "direction" would have been more appropriate. My concept of sanity could be defined more precisely as "freedom from internal conflict"--implying, of course, harmony with certain basic principles which seem to be inherent in rational thought, e.g., Occam's Razor. (This principle is clearly violated by the unnecessarily involved theology of the Catholic Church and various other belief systems without a sound empirical basis.) In general, though, I think I had a fairly clear conception when I wrote my essay of what constitutes sane behavior in operational terms, i.e., the controlled spontaneity of music or athletics, rather than obsessive-compulsive behavior. I believe, instead, that my main error in the essay is that I attempt to find an individual solution for mankind as a whole, plainly a foolish endeavor, as each individual must find a solution for himself to the basic existential problems and to those of his relationship to society as it is today. I can, perhaps, help a few individuals whose viewpoints are similar to mine toward self-realization, but to expect the world as a whole to take serious notice of my utopian schemes is unrealistic. For the world I feel little concern; I do not consider nuclear war to be a serious threat in the foreseeable future, as the weapons are in the hands

of cautious politicians rather than rabid idealists; over-population will, as usual, solve itself, either through war, plague or famine, if a eugenic solution is not found. I have little hope that the majority of the human race will ever become very sane, by any rational definition of the term, but I am quite confident that our species will eventually evolve into a race at once more balanced and more capable than our own. As to the problem of individual autonomy for the highly sensitive, intelligent, or creative individual, I must admit that I have no solution, except that he must somehow force himself to work, despite an extremely hostile environment, to create for himself a favorable climate in which to pursue his serious work.

Chay Borsella's remarks are what one would expect from the unlettered; I won't bother to refute them in detail, but will only point out that education increases one's capacity to live forcefully, especially in a complex civilization, and to experience either pleasure or pain. To refuse to risk the latter in pursuit of the former is to deny life.

I see that A. G. Smith admits to prejudice, but appears to be doing nothing to correct this situation. This is the very depth of irrationality, against which logic is powerless; the only sensible course is to refuse to argue with him.

"The Russian government, cynically to be sure, but none the less skillfully, has arrayed itself in the cause of the poor, the downtrodden, and of those who have no other spokesman. That it has done this dishonestly has not made the tactic any less effective, especially when it has done this in the face of a nation that ideologically claims to stand for the right things and actually, so often, has stood for the wrong. In short, it would seem that those who shout most loudly 'no surrender' have been leading us into a very real kind of surrender--for it is surrender when one refuses to meet his enemy on the battlefield upon which the war is being fought. If democratic free enterprise is a better system than totalitarian communism, then it will win; but only if its protagonists have the courage of their convictions. Thus far we have shown little, and, with the building of back-yard bomb shelters, the last of our courage would seem to have fled." --Bishop James A. Pike, in "God and the H-Bomb".

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The letter reprinted in Kipple #56 from the Baltimore Sun reminded me of the mild donnybrook that occurred in the letter section of the Louisville Courier-Journal when that worthy periodical published an editorial supporting the Supreme Court's ruling banning prayer and Bible reading from public schools. The formula for all of the epistles was as follows: first, a pious mention of God and/or Jesus Christ, Our Savior; then a sentence or two denouncing the "atheistic Communists who want to take over the country; and finally, a call to arms for all good Christians to rise in holy wrath and smite the infidels.

I'm afraid that Kevin Langdon's cause is hopeless. How many parents would allow their little darlings to be subjected to the sort of schooling he envisions? Also, to establish such an educational system on a large scale would require government financing; how do you think that would sit with our revered Congress?

Re the abortion controversy, I'd like to know which of these two alternatives Tom Seidman would prefer: (1) the birth of a child illegitimately into a world in which it would be subjected to misery, poverty, and social ostracism; or (2) the "murder" of the child while still un-

born, thus saving that individual from all sorts of suffering? (This impresses me as an extremely weak justification for abortion, since the difficulty appears quite obviously to lie in the narrow standards of society--which, even now, are in the process of widening.)

I would also like to take issue with the idea that the use of contraceptives can be defined as infanticide by any stretch of the imagination. Abortion "murders" the unborn child; but I don't see any way that contraception could be construed as murder, inasmuch as there is no foetus to be murdered. And you, Ted, say that each human is indispensable because of his unique heredity. Indispensable to whom or what? I assume you mean; indispensable to the genetic future of mankind. But by that reasoning, the children who are never even conceived are as valuable as your poor little "murder" victims; therefore it is the moral duty of every human to marry and produce as many children as possible. If that idea were accepted by a large proportion of humanity, the saturation point would come to this planet before the end of the century. (A human being is "indispensable" not because he is necessarily useful to the genetic future of mankind, but simply because he is unique and hence irreplaceable. This does not apply to "children who are never even conceived", because prior to conception no organism identifiable as an individual human being exists.)

A. G. Smith's letter points up one of the inconvenient things about freedom of speech--intelligent people are subjected to such garbage as his racist theories.

I may have missed something, but the reference by Charles Crispin to Robert Heinlein's extrapolated racism was a complete surprise. Possibly there was something of the sort in "Glory Road"; I didn't read it at all closely. However, Heinlein's aliens are almost always sympathetically portrayed, and in a large number of cases their civilization is not inferior to that of earth but merely pointed in a different direction--cf. the Martian civilizations in "Red Planet", "Double Star" and "Stranger in a Strange Land". It seems to be fashionable to criticize Heinlein nowadays for everything from militarism to immaturity; let us at least have our gripes based more soundly in fact.

"The fact that a believer is happier than a sceptic is no more to the point than the fact that a drunken man is happier than a sober one. The happiness of credulity is a cheap and dangerous quality."
--George Bernard Shaw.

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Kevin Langdon's "The Achievement of Sanity" was certainly a thought-provoking essay, though most of the thought it provoked in this quarter was in opposition to the central theses of the article. On a most fundamental level, I'm uncertain of the wisdom of dismissing an entire society as "insane" simply because the corporate goals of that society and the individual goals of its members fail to conform to the goals preferred by Mr. Langdon. It's an historical tradition, of course, that the intelligentsia of any given era will develop an insular relationship with "the masses" and consequently engage in snobbery the like of which it is difficult to equal, but Langdon appears to have gone one step beyond even this presumptuous position. If I read his essay correctly, it is his opinion that the man whose goals in life include a new automobile, a house in the suburbs, and a season ticket to the Yankee games, rather than intellectual and spiritual fulfillment, is not only mistaken, but insane. This is a very interesting value judgement, which reveals more about the essayist than about the society which he

presumes to judge.

We could argue endlessly, however, over the question of whether society is properly termed "insane" without even agreeing on definitions. But it's plain that Kevin and I both recognize the fact that society has many shortcomings and irrational aspects, disagreeing chiefly on what course of action ought to be pursued by the (pardon my pretentiousness) "enlightened" individual. He seems to feel that the ills of society are so imposing as to render the patient incapable of recovery, and recommends that the "sane" individual (in this context, the man who acknowledges the inconsistencies and faults of our society, and has purged his own personality of the various narrow attitudes common to its members) reject society and attempt to live apart from it. (He says: "...our sane individual will involve himself with the institutions of present-day society as little as is consistent with survival and intellectual development.") This is the reaction of the so-called beat generation to society, a wholly negative, fatalistic, cowardly ("you can't fire me; I quit") reaction. I think it was you, Ted, who observed a number of issues ago that a single sit-in demonstration undertaken by a single college student was worth more than the entire "beat" movement; I quite agree. The refusal to involve oneself in an imperfect society is a petulant and childish attitude, a more sophisticated version of a kid's refusal to play in a game whose rules don't suit him.

This attitude is consistent with Kevin's apparent belief that human society is getting worse ("its institutions grow more and more oppressive of the individual") rather than, as the rest of us believe, better. This is a strange belief, though maybe I doubt it only because I feel myself a part of this society--a feeling which Kevin, to judge from his essay, does not experience on any but a superficial level. But I'll compare this present society to any past society by any criteria Kevin cares to name; more people (relatively as well as actually) enjoy genuine freedom in today's world than at any time in the past, including that old standby utopia, Periclean Athens (where the slaves outnumbered the citizens by a considerable margin). One of the reasons for this improvement is technological progress--often belittled as "mere material improvement" by those strangely blind utopians who crop up in every generation--for the obvious reason that a man with a full belly and a roof over his head has more time to devote to the loftier pursuits of abstract thought and art. There are still many areas in which society as a whole and our American society in particular badly needs improvement, but my reaction to this imperfection is to work to improve it, not to shuffle off to a dark corner and say the hell with it.

Of course, Kevin is suggesting nothing quite so obvious as that; he maintains at least the illusion of constructive effort by proselytizing in favor of Summerhill-type education--which may, at that, be a good idea, and never mind what I said about it in #56. But can Kevin honestly believe that such a scheme constitutes a realistic program? In order to institute a system of Summerhill-type education on a scale large enough to make the effort worthwhile, the Federal government would have to act; that is, in effect, to say that "enlightened" individuals would have to gain control of the government. Having done so, of course, other worthwhile reforms could be initiated by this now-enlightened government, a course of action of which I am strongly in favor. But how can "sane" men eventually dominate the government if they follow the advice given in Kevin's essay to abstain from involvement in the institutions of society?

The only way in which the distorted values of our society may be replaced by more rational ones is for the minority of citizens who recognize the deficiencies to labor within the context of our form of government to reform the defective institutions or customs. Nothing worthwhile

has ever been or is ever likely to be accomplished in the way of reform by the sort of studied apathy which Kevin advocates.

Now that that "secure subdivision of the liberal North", Wisconsin, has astonished the political pundits and frightened the liberals into reconsidering their over-confident view of integrationist sentiment in the North, maybe you'll revise your prediction of the outcome of the Maryland primary election. (The fact that I underestimated the forces of bigotry in Wisconsin--about which, quite frankly, I knew little prior to the election--does not significantly alter my expectations for the Maryland contest. The only qualification I would attach to the previous prediction (Brewster 79%-84%; Wallace 16%-21%) is that a small turn-out, due to poor weather or other unforeseeable conditions, would tend to increase the percentage of the total vote acquired by Wallace.) I admit to being surprised mildly by Wallace's 264,000 votes, though a number of things totally unconnected with his racism must have had a great deal to do with his impressive showing--not the least of which being the unique situation in that state which allows Republicans to vote in the Democratic contest. But even making allowances for this and other factors, we are left with the sad fact that the number of prejudiced people, even in the Solid North, must be calculated in six figures.

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"If we are to assume that anybody has designedly set this wonderful universe going, it is perfectly clear to me that he is no more entirely benevolent and just in any intelligible sense of the words, than that he is malevolent and unjust." --Thomas Henry Huxley, in "Life and Letters".
